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I. INTRODUCTION
While public opinion in the United States often is hard to
accurately measure, an occasional dramatic criminal case pres-
ents an issue with such starkness that the public response dem-
onstrates society's instinctive reaction to the issue. Rarely has
public intrigue with child homicide been more clearly exempli-
fied than the trial, conviction, and post-conviction disposition of
British au pair Louise Woodward in the fall of 1997.
Louise Woodward was indicted in Massachusetts for the
murder of eight-month-old Matthew Eappen. The Common-
wealth's case was based primarily on medical evidence indicat-
ing the baby died as a result of a violent shaking and fracture to
the base of the skull that led to fatal brain injuries.
2 Although
the jury convicted Woodward of murder, the trial judge ruled
that the conviction for murder amounted to a substantial mis-
' See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277 (Mass. 1998). The Woodward
case has been matched in notoriety by previous cases that raised public awareness of
child abuse. See, e.g., Barry Bendetowies, Note, Felony Murder and Child Abuse: A Pro-
posalfor the NY State Legislature, 18 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 383 (1990-91) (recommending a
felony murder rule in the aftermath of the brutal killing of Lisa Steinberg for which
the defendant was convicted only of manslaughter).
2 See William F. Doherty, Eye Doctor Helps Build Case Against Au Pair, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 11, 1997, at B3; William F. Doherty, Doctor Recounts Autopsy of Baby, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 10, 1997, at B3; William F. Doherty, Doctor Says Baby in Au Pair Case Took
Blow to Head, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 1997, at A37.
The prosecutors also relied on incriminating statements of the defendant and the
fact that the defendant had custody of the child when he began exhibiting symptoms
of serious injury. See William F. Doherty, Detective Details Au Pair's Interview, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 15, 1997, at B2.
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carriage of justice, reduced the conviction to involuntary man-
slaughter, and released the defendant after sentencing her to
time served.3
At the heart of his opinion was the trial judge's belief that
Louise Woodward did not act with malice:
I believe that the circumstances in which Defendant acted were charac-
terized by confusion, inexperience, frustration, immaturity and some
anger, but not malice (in the legal sense) supporting a conviction for
second degree murder. Frustrated by her inability to quiet the crying
child, she was 'a little rough with him,' under circumstances where an-
other, perhaps wiser, person would have sought to restrain the physical
impulse.4
This type of justification is not unfamiliar to child abuse
prosecutors. Juries and judges would like to believe a child's
death results from accidental or perhaps slightly "rough" behav-
ior, and not that the death is the result of a caretaker who in-
tends to kill or cause great bodily harm to a child. A finder of
fact must be convinced that a defendant acted with a particular
mental state to convict the person of murder, and many juries
(and judges) are reluctant to make such a finding when a child
is killed at the hands of a caretaker.5 This is so for several rea-
sons.
'se Woodward, 694 N.E.2d at 1281; Commonwealth v. Woodward, 7 Mass. L. Rep.
449, 452, No. Crim. 97-0433, 1997 WL 694119 at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 1997).
'Commonwealth v. Woodward, 7 Mass. L. Rep. at 452, 1997 WL 694119 at *6. The
judge then expressed a variation of the defense theory that the "roughness was suffi-
cient to start (or re-start) a bleeding that escalated fatally." Id. at 452, *6. For a re-
sponse from the pediatric community to the medical evidence presented by the
defense, see David L. Chadwick et. al., Shaken Baby Syndrome-A Forensic Pediatric Re-
sponse, 101 PEDIATRICS 321 (1998) (letter signed by 72 physicians who specialize in the
diagnosis and treatment of child abuse).
'The U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect spent two years studying
child fatalities and hearing testimony from individuals around the country. The
Board encountered numerous examples of professionals as well as lay persons reluc-
tant to believe caretakers knowingly kill children. As memberJ. Tom Morgan stated:
"Prosecutors all over the country will tell you that the easiest murder to get away with
is the killing of an infant or small child by a parent or caretaker." U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, A NATION'S SHAME: FATAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN
THE UNITED STATES 58 (1995).
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First, motive is often unclear when a caretaker kills a child.
Unlike a fight between adults that escalates to a killing, there
may be little evidence as to why a caretaker would kill a child.
Even when a motive exists, the reason for the killing may be so
trivial as to be nearly incomprehensible to most people.
Moreover, it is often difficult for the finder of fact to determine
whether the fatal act resulted from a one-time response from
frustration and anger, or if it was the result of hatred and genu-
ine ill-will toward the child.
Another difficulty with prosecuting child homicide is the
frequent lack of external injuries. A gunshot or knife wound is
readily understandable; evidence of a cerebral hematoma in an
otherwise healthy child is not. Child homicide often is commit-
ted by a caretaker who is alone with a child for an extended pe-
riod of time, almost never involves the type of deadly weapons
commonly associated with homicides of adults and older chil-
dren, and results in injuries requiring careful observation by a
medical examiner.8 As a result, child homicide cases often re-
sult in a battle of medical experts, with the jury decision hinging
on the credibility of the experts. 9
Finally, many people simply cannot believe adults kill chil-
dren in their care, leading some jurors and judges to resist ver-
dicts that place a high degree of culpability on a caretaker.10
6 See, e.g., Steve Scott, Twenty Years Given To Man in Son's Beating Death, DALLAS
MORNING NEws, Aug. 19, 1997, at 13A (describing conviction of father who beat his
son to death over anger that his son was playing too loudly during a football broad-
cast). Medical literature reports the most frequent reasons for killing a young child
as being anger over an infant's crying and anger over infants and toddlers soiling
themselves. See Albert L. Brewster et al., Victim, Perpetrator Family, and Incident Charac-
teristics of 32 Infant Maltreatment Deaths in the United States Air Force, 22 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 91, 100 (1998) (58% of perpetrators who killed an infant 12 months old or
younger reported an infant's crying as preceding the abusive episode).
See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
See AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
OF CHIL ABUSE 402-25 (2d ed. 1993).
9 Id. at 440-42.
10 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 5; Nancy
Lewis, Sentences in Child Deaths Are Unpredictable, Varied, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1998, at
A9 (comparing sentences for child deaths in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area
from 1992 through 1995); Steve Mills & Louise Kiernan, Getting Away with Murder
CHi. TRm., Nov. 15, 1998, § 1, at 1 (analyzing child homicide prosecutions in the Chi-
cago area).
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Additionally, even prosecutors," child protective service work-
ers, police, and medical professionals 12 may fail to recognize or
pursue cases of child homicide.'3
In spite of frequent societal lethargy on the issue, some leg-
islatures have actively encouraged useful innovations. For ex-
ample, legislators aware of the risk of misdiagnosing child abuse
as sudden infant death syndrome14 have encouraged criminal
investigation of suspicious child deaths by mandating autopsies
of children who die with no known cause. Other legislation en-
courages the formation of child death review teams to bring to-
gether professionals from a variety of disciplines to evaluate
child deaths in a jurisdiction and further investigate deaths that
do not appear to be from natural means. 5
Some jurisdictions faced with recurrent problems have en-
acted special homicide statutes."6 These statutes take two basic
" SeeJacy Showers &Julio Apolo, CriminalDisposition of Persons Involved in 72 Cases
of Fatal Child Abus 26 Mn. Sa. L. 243 (1986) (finding criminal charges were filed in
one jurisdiction in fewer than one-half of cases of suspected fatal child abuse because
of insufficient evidence).
" SeeRobert H. Kirschner, The Pathology of Child Abuse, in THE BATFRED CHILD 248,
271 (Mary Edna Heifer et al. eds., 5th ed. 1997) ("[1] nflicted head trauma deaths con-
tinue to be difficult to prosecute because there is often no external evidence of injury
(this can lead to speculation about mysterious or trivial accidental injury) and be-
cause many clinicians and pathologists equivocate about the timing of the lethal
event.").
,3 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICEs, supra note 5, at 43 ("The Board
heard the testimony of prosecutors who conceded that charges of child homicides,
including heinous cases, are routinely reduced to lesser crimes."); see also RICHARD
FSTMmN &JAMIE TALAN, THE DEATH OF INNOCENTs (1997).
" See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of sudden infant
death syndrome.
" See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERviCES, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATE
STATUTE SERIES: MANDATORYAUToPSIES AND CHILD DEATH REVIEW TEAMS (1997). The
success of these laws cannot be easily evaluated, although most professionals believe
they provide a useful tool for identifying cases of child homicide. See U.S. DFP'T. OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 5, at 87-92.
See Angela M. Stewart, Murder by Child Abuse, 26 WmLAMETT L. REv. 435
(1990) (discussing Oregon law passed in 1989 in part in response to a perceived dis-
proportionately low offense-first degree manslaughter-for the beating death of a
child); Gary R. Wade, The Trexler Saga: Hale and Middlebrooks, 23 MEMPHIS ST. U.L.
REv. 319 (1993) (discussing Tennessee law passed in 1988 in response to a jury's re-
fusal to convict a defendant of first degree murder in a child homicide prosecution);
Paul H. Taylor, Note, Ciminal Law-Child Abuse Resulting in Death-Arkansas Amends
Its First Degree Murder Statute, 10 U. ARK. LrrmE ROCK L. J. 785 (1987-88) (discussing
1999
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forms. One type of child homicide statute simply lists a child
physical abuse offense as an enumerated felony in a felony
murder statute. The second type of law designates a separate
homicide offense for the death of a child caused during an act
of child abuse. 7 Both types of statutes replace the traditional
mental state element for the crime of murder with either proof
of the intent attached to the underlying felony, or proof of reck-
lessness, extreme indifference to human life, or a similar mental
state. These statutes ease the difficulty of proving a more seri-
ous homicide offense and establish a significant penalty for the
violent killing of a child.
18
This article examines the need for these special statutes.
Part II analyzes sociological and medical information related to
child homicide in the United States. Part III considers case law,
highlighting difficulties of trial judges, juries, and appellate
courts relying on circumstantial evidence to establish intent in
child homicide cases. Part IV examines current child homicide
statutes in the United States. Part V presents model child homi-
cide statutes and recommendations.
II. CHILD HOMICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES
Although thorough data on child homicides19 do not exist,
the U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect estimates
Arkansas law passed in 1987 in response to a state Supreme Court opinion reducing a
child homicide conviction from first to second degree murder).
1 See infra notes 175-94 and accompanying text.
'a A third type of statute that can have a similar effect as a child homicide statute is
one which raises the penalty for a lesser offense when a child is the victim. For rea-
sons discussed in Part IV, I do not classify these as child homicide statutes. See infra
notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
"The term "child homicide" as used in this article refers to the killing of a child in
the course of committing a battery or physical abuse upon the child. This definition
excludes several categories of cases. For example, the largest age group of child
homicide victims is teenagers, but the extraordinarily high rate of teen homicides in
the United States is primarily the result of drug related or gang violence, rather than
family violence. Nearly all teen homicides involve the use of firearms or knives.
David Finkelhor, The Homicides of Children and Youth, in OuT OF Tm DARKNESS:
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 17-19 (Glenda Kaufman Kantor &
Jana L Jasinski eds., 1997) (86% of teen homicides committed by use of a firearm,
10% with a knife). These cases are excluded from this discussion. Similarly excluded
are cases involving domestic violence in which a child is not the intended victim or
the child is killed along with other family members, but not in the course of an epi-
[Vol. 89
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that approximately 2,000 infants or young children a year are
victims of homicide by abuse or neglect in the United States.'
By far, children under five are at greatest risk for being killed by
abuse or neglect, with homicide being the "leading cause of
death related to injury in the first year of life."2 1 Finkelhor re-
ports that children under five are the victims in 92% of child
abuse deaths.2 Of these, 40% of child victims are under one
year old, 18% between the age of one and two, and 13% ages
two to three.2s The official rate of homicides of children under
five is 3.6 per 100,000,24 although some experts believe the ac-
tual number to be as much as 11.6 per 100,000.2 According to
one author, homicide is the cause of death among children
sode that is abusive in itself. Finally, cases involving death due to inadequate supervi-
sion or criminal neglect are excluded. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
Included within this definition are cases of infanticide. Although often poorly
defined, infanticide refers to the killing of a newborn under circumstances in which
the caretaker (usually, but not always, the mother) does not want the child and inten-
tionally kills the child after birth. (The term neonaticide describes the killing of an
infant within the first 24 hours of life.) Although some issues of proof-such as
whether a child was born alive-are unique to these cases, they are treated as child
abuse homicides in this article. For a discussion of infanticide, see Finkelhor, supra,
at 2324. For additional discussion of the scope of child homicide statutes, see infra
notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
20 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 5, at 9. The report indi-
cates that government agencies and other organizations report data ranging from just
under 800 to approximately 1,300 deaths from the early 1990s. Id. The most recent
government report estimates 1,500 child homicides in 1993. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, THE THIRD NAnONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
3-12 (Andrea Sedlak & Diane D. Broadhurst eds., 1996).
For an examination of child homicide statistics in England, see ANIA WILCZYNSX,
CILD HOMICDE (1997).
2, CarolynJ. Levitt et al., Abusive Head Trauma, in CHILD ABUSE: MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS
AND MANAGEMENT 1, 5 (Robert M. Reece ed., 1994).
2See Finkelhor, supra note 19, at 24. Relatively few children age 5 through 12 are
victims of fatal child abuse (fewer than eight percent of total child abuse deaths). Of
those children in this age group who are murdered, approximately half are victims of
a caretaker. These children are more likely than younger children to be victims of
strangers, and older children in this category are victims of gang violence. While still
present, fatal family violence does not have the prominence in this age group that it
does in younger children. See id. at 26-27.
" See id. at 24.
24 See id. at 22-23.
2U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 5, at 8.
1999
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seven times more frequently than meningitis and twenty times
more often that AIDS. 6
Those who kill young children are nearly always caretakers
or persons in a significant relationship to the child. In one of
the few studies to systematically examine the relationship of the
perpetrator to the victim, Starling et al. found, in reviewing the
records of 127 young victims of fatal and non-fatal abusive head
trauma whose abuser was identified, 94.5% were in a parent or
caretaker relationship to the child.27 Of these, 21% were baby-
sitters, 37% fathers, 20.5% boyfriends of the victim's mother,
12.6% mothers, and 3% stepfathers." The study concluded that
men and babysitters are much more likely to commit these of-
fenses than previously suspected. 9
The homicide of infants and young children is infrequently
accomplished with the use of firearms, knives, or other weapons
commonly classified as dangerous.' Rather, very young chil-
dren are killed at the hands of their caretakers. Although the
most common cause of death in children under five years of age
is beating,31 the very youngest victims are more likely to be suf-
'6Levitt et al., supra note 21, at 5.
' Suzanne P. Starling et al., Abusive Head Trauma: The Relationship of Perpetrators to
Their Victim, 95 PEDIATRICS 259, 260 (1995). See also Susan B. Sorenson et al., Child
Homicide in the City of Los Angeles: An Epidemiologic Examination of a Decade of Deaths, 1 J.
AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT & TRAUMA 189, 193 (1997) (suspects in homicides of
children under four years old from 1980 through 1989 were family members in 77%
of cases, nonfamily members known to the victim in 7% of cases, and strangers in
2.5% of cases).
2Starling et al., supra note 27, at 260. A significant caveat to this study is that not
all of the persons identified as "perpetrators" confessed to the offense or were con-
victed at the time of publication of the study. The authors clearly identify the adults
by categories: whether they confessed, were convicted, or were suspected of abuse be-
cause the explanation the person gave did not account for the injuries to the child.
Id. at 259.
2 Id. at 260-61. Interestingly, of those in their sample who admitted to the abuse,
28 were fathers or boyfriends. Id. No babysitters admitted abusing the child, and
were identified in the study by whether they were charged or suspected of committing
the abuse. Id. at 260.
See generally, Finkelhor, supra note 19, at 22-23.
"Katherine Kaufer Christoffel, Child Abuse Fatalities, in C-LD ABUSE: A MEDICAL
REFERENCE 49, 51 (Stephen Ludwig & Allan E. Komberg eds., 1992).
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focated, violently shaken, or thrown. These causes of death are
discussed below.
A. SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME
In recent years the existence of shaken baby syndrome has
gained heightened public awareness due in part to highly publi-
cized criminal cases and to intensive public information cam-
paigns.' s In general, shaken baby syndrome describes injuries of
infants and young children resulting from a violent shaking in-
flicted by an adult. As defined by one pathologist, shaken baby
syndrome is "the result of a violent shaking force that causes a
whiplash acceleration-deceleration motion of the relatively un-
stable infant's head upon its neck." 4 Based on comparisons to
accidental injuries and statements made by numerous abusers,ss
medical literature describes the mechanism of shaken baby syn-
drome as an adult who holds a child by the rib cage or shoul-
ders and severely shakes the child forward and back for a period
ranging from five to twenty seconds and may involve as many as
forty to fifty violent shakes.- Victims of violent shaking are usu-
"Levitt et al., supra note 21, at 6 (stating that abusive head injury accounts for a
"substantial but undefined" percentage of fatalities, and indicating that 80% or more
of deaths from head trauma in children under the age of two are the result of abusive
head injury).
"SeeJacy Showers, Don't Shake the Baby: The Effectiveness of a Prevention Program, 16
CIuLD ABusE & NEGLECT 11 (1992).
"Kirschner, supra note 12, at 271.
For classic discussions of shaken baby syndrome that are still widely cited in the
medical literature, see John Caffey, On the Theory and Practice of Shaking Infants, 124
AM. J. DsEAsEs CHILmDREN 161 (1972); John Caffey, The Whiplash Shaken Infant Syn-
drome, 54 PEDIATRICS 396 (1974). For a technical medical discussion of shaken baby
syndrome, see Committee on Child Abuse & Neglect, American Academy of Pediat-
rics, Shaken Baby Syndrome: Inflicted Cerebral Trauma, 92 PEDIATRIcs 872 (1993); Derek
A. Bruce & Robert A. Zimmerman, Shaken Impact Syndrome, 18 PEDIATRIC ANNALS 482
(1989).
' With increased use of video surveillance in hospitals, child care centers, and
homes, episodes of violent shaking are increasingly videotaped. See David P. Southall
et al., Covert Video Recordings of Life-Threatening Child Abuse: Lessons for Child Protection,
100 PEDIATeics 735, 737 (1997).
"Levitt et al., supra note 21, at 4. Shaking also occurs by grabbing the child by the
legs or ankles and "either shaking or swinging him in a circular motion." Mary E.
Case, Head Injuty in Child Abus4 in CEMD MALTREATMENT: A CINICAL GUIDE AND
REFERENCE 87, 95 (James A. Monteleone ed., 2d ed. 1998).
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ally under two years old, although they may be older depending
on the relative sizes of the child and the adult.,
7
During the shaking, the child's head swings forward until
the chin strikes the child's chest and then swings back until the
back of the head strikes the child's back. Due to an infant's
relatively large head and weak neck muscles, the head moves in
a violent "whiplash" fashion.ss The resulting trauma to the brain
and accompanying lack of oxygen to brain cells causes the brain
to swell and to increase the pressure within the skull.8 9 If not re-
lieved, the swelling will kill the child.40 Victims who survive a
violent shaking often lose their sight or suffer permanent brain
damage.4 '
The motion of the child's brain rotating violently within the
skull also causes tiny veins to tear and bleed in the compart-
ments between the brain and its coverings.4 ' This bleeding re-
sults in a subdural hematoma or subarachnoid hemorrhage (or
both) 4 The bleeding is a marker that severe force has been
used, but is not itself the most serious injury; the life-
threatening injury is the direct damage to the brain itself."
Rather than solely shaking an infant, abusers often throw or
slam a child onto a floor, against a wall, or into another firm
surface, resulting in skull fractures and additional damage to
7Case, supra note 36, at 95.
9Id. at 99-100.
4' Derek A. Bruce, Neurological Aspects of Child Abuse, in CHILD ABUSE: A MEDICAL
REFERENcE 117, 118 (Stephen Ludwig & Allan E. Kornberg eds., 1992). Even if physi-
cians are able to relieve the pressure, the threat of serious injury or death remains.
See ANGELO P. GARDaoIN ET AL., A PRACIcAL GUIDE TO THE EVALUATION OF CL
PHySicALABUSE ANDNEGLECT 151-52 (1997).
41James A. Monteleone & Armand E. Brodeur, Identifying, Interpreting, and Reporting
Injuries, in CHILD MALTREATMENT: A CLNICAL GUIDE AND REREN E 1, 15 (James A.
Monteleone ed., 2d ed. 1998); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 5,
at 16-17.
' Two of the membranes covering the brain are the dura mater and the arachnoid
membrane. See TABEW'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICrIONARY 140, 584 (18th ed. 1997).
Bleeding beneath the dura mater is termed "subdural hematoma" (or "subdural hem-
orrhage"), and bleeding beneath the arachnoid membrane is termed "subarachnoid
hemorrhage." See GiARD No ETAL., supra note 40, at 149.
Case, supra note 36, at 100.
"Id. See also Kirschner, supra note 12, at 273-74.
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the brain.4 There may be no external signs of impact such as
bruising if a child is thrown against a "yielding" surface.4 Medi-
cal literature demonstrates that, while shaking with impact is
common, shaking alone is sufficient to cause severe injury or
death.47
Common findings of shaken baby syndrome include subdu-
ral hematoma, skull fractures (if impact is involved), extensive
bleeding in the back of the inner surface of the eyes (retinal
hemorrhages), and broken or bruised ribs or arms from where
the child was held. The existence of any combination of these
injuries provides strong evidence of abuse,48 but the absence of
"Some physicians emphasize that when impact is involved, the mechanism is no
longer accurately described as shaken baby syndrome. Thus, a distinction is made be-
tween shaken baby and shaken-impact syndrome. See Ann-Christine Duhaime et al.,
Nonaccidental Head Injuty in Infants-The "Shaken Baby Syndrome," 338 NEw ENG. J. IED.
1822 (1998) (arguing that "shaking-impact syndrome" is a more accurate term); Betty
S. Spivack, Biomechanics of Nonaccidental Trauma, in CMLD ABUSE: A MEDICAL
RE1RNCE 61, 76 (Stephen Ludwig & Allan E. Kornberg eds., 1992). As a practical
matter, a person who violently shakes an infant is unlikely to gently place the child
back in bed, and thus, some degree of impact is likely. However, this impact may not
result in fractures or other visible manifestations. As pathologist Mary Case notes:
It may not be helpful to try to distinguish a child's head injury as resulting from either
impact or shaking because the pathology is identical in both. If there are focal injuries
such as skull fractures or scalp bruises, certainly impact can be assumed. In the absence
of such impacts, however, shaking only should not be presumed.
Case, supra note 36, at 100.
While the mechanism should be as clearly described as possible during a prose-
cution, clear descriptions are not always given in the cases. Thus, for purposes of this
article, all cases in which shaking was identified by an expert witness are classified as
shaken baby syndrome, even though impact may have been involved (although not
clearly identified in the case).
"Monteleone & Brodeur, supra note 41, at 14. The authors explain:
A boxer may be knocked unconscious, with injury to the brain, after impact from a
gloved and cushioned hand yet suffer no facial bruising. In like manner, a child thrown
against a soft crib mattress, bed, or carpeted floor can sustain severe brain injuries with
no evidence of external damage.
Id.
"See Case, supra note 36, at 99.
For example, retinal hemorrhages are nearly diagnostic of abuse. See Mon-
teleone & Brodeur, supra note 41, at 15 ("retinal hemorrhages in an infant without a
history of severe accidental trauma constitutes child abuse until proven otherwise");
Alex V. Levin, Ophthalmologic Manifestations, in CHILD ABUSE: A MEDICAL REFERENCE
CHARLES A. PHIPPS
one or more such injuries does not preclude a shaken baby syn-
drome diagnosis. Other injuries that one might expect to find
frequently are, in fact, rare. In addition, different injuries may
be present depending on the precise mechanism of injury.
A child with a fatal head injury will lose consciousness, suf-
fer convulsions, have difficulty breathing, or exhibit other clear
symptoms soon after the incident. Thus, in the case of fatal
head injury, the trauma most likely occurred after the last con-
firmed period of normal consciousness. As explained by one of
the foremost pediatric, forensic pathologists in the United
States:
Fatal shaking events are, with rare exception, characterized clini-
cally by almost immediate loss of consciousness, often with associated
seizures and apnea. Irritability, inability to feed, vomitinS, and lethargy
are common components of less severe shaking episodes.
Many medical experts equate the force necessary to kill a
child with the force of an automobile accident or a fall from an
upper story window.51 As stated by the American Academy of
191, 198 (Stephen Ludwig & Allan E. Kornberg eds., 1992) (retinal hemorrhages are
"one of the cardinal manifestations" of shaken baby syndrome, occurring in 50-80%
of shaken baby syndrome infants).
49 See David F. Merten et al., Skeletal Manifestation of Child Abuse, in CHILD ABUSE:
MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT 23, 40 (Robert M. Reece ed., 1994) ("fracture
and/or ligamentous injury to the cervical vertebrae is remarkably rare despite the fact
that spinal injuries in abused infants are presumably a result of violent shaking").
0 Kirschner, supra note 12, at 273. Elsewhere, Kirschner and Harry Wilson state:
"Lethal injuries produce progressively more severe symptoms almost immediately; no
significant 'lucid' or asymptomatic period occurs." Robert H. Kirschner & Harry L.
Wilson, Fatal Child Abuse: The Pathologist's Perspective, in CHILD ABUSE: MEDICAL
DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT 325, 350 (Robert M. Reece ed., 1994). "[S]evere head
trauma in infants produces immediate symptoms. This rule applies to both shaken
babies and infants with skull fractures and cerebral injuries." 1d. at 352.
Pathologists explain that immediate symptoms always are present when "diffuse
axonal injury" is detected. Diffuse axonal injury is the tearing of tiny nerve tissues in
the brain. If a shaking is severe enough, injuries to these tissues cause immediate
symptoms such as loss of consciousness, breathing difficulty, and seizures. See Case,
supra note 36, at 100. Although pathologists are not able to identify diffuse axonal
injuries in every shaken baby case, when identified such injuries provide clear evi-
dence that a child would not have had a period of consciousness after infliction of the
injuries. Id.
"1 See Jones v. State, 439 S.E.2d 645, 647 (Ga. 1994) (head injuries from shaking
consistent with fall from three to four story building); State v. Mosley, 414 N.W.2d
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Pediatrics: "[T]he act of shaking/slamming is so violent that
competent individuals observing the shaking would recognize it
as dangerous. " 2 Short distance falls rarely cause skull fractures,
but if they do, the fractures are small (less than one millimeter)
and differ in type from fractures seen in shaken babies.3 These
forces require the strength of an adult; it is not plausible to ex-
plain massive intracranial injury as inflicted by another young
child or as the product of normal activity such as bouncing chil-
dren playfully.
5 4
A variety of theories that do not involve severe, traumatic in-
juries on the scale of car accidents have been produced in re-
cent years by experts testifying on behalf of criminal defendants
in child homicide prosecutions. Few of these theories are sup-
ported in the scientific literature on shaken baby syndrome.0 A
prominent group of seventy-two physicians who specialize in the
diagnosis and treatment of child abuse victims responded to the
expert testimony in the Louise Woodward case with a strong re-
joinder, stating in part:
The hypothesis put forward by the defense that minor trauma caused a
"re-bleed" of an earlier head injury can best be characterized as inaccu-
rate, contrary to vast clinical experience and unsupported by any pub-
461, 463 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (fatal liver injury consistent with degree of force com-
parable to a car accident); State v. Johnson, 400 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Wis. Ct. App.
1986) (fatal injuries to abdomen comparable to 50 mile per hour automobile colli-
sion). See also M. Elaine Billmire & Patricia A. Myers, Serious Head Injuy in Infants: Ac-
cident orAbuse?, 75 PEDIATRICS 340, 342 (1985); Kirschner, supra note 12, at 275.
't Committee on Child Abuse & Neglect, supra note 34, at 872.
See generaly Ann-Christine Duhaime et al., Head Injury in Very Young Children:
Mechanisms, Injuy Types, and Ophthalmologic Findings in 100 Hospitalized Patients Younger
than 2 Years of Age, 90 PEDIATRICS 179, 182-84 (1992); Monteleone & Brodeur, supra
note 41, at 8-9; Gregory D. Reiber, Fatal Falls in Childhood: How Far Must Children Fall to
Sustain Fatal Head Injury ?, 14 AM.J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 201 (1993).
'4 Levitt et al., supra note 21, at 4.
See David L Chadwick & Henry F. Krous, Irresponsible Testimony by Medical Experts
in Cases Involving the Physical Abuse and Neglect of Children, 2 CH-ILD MALTREATMENr 313
(1997). Cf Jan Bays, Conditions Mistaken for Child Abuse, in CH= ABUSE: MEDICAL
DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT 358 (Robert M. Reece ed., 1994) (describing conditions
recognized by medical professionals as capable of being mistaken for child abuse);
Arthur Zinn, Genetic Disorders that Mimic Child Abuse or Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, in
CHILD ABUSE: MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT 404 (Robert M. Reece ed., 1994).
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lished literature. The "re-bleed" theory in infants is a courtroom "diag-
nosis," not a medical diagnosis, and the jury properly rejected it.s
B. SUFFOCATION
Death by suffocation is even more difficult to identify than
death caused by shaken baby syndrome. Unless a perpetrator
applies force sufficient to cause bruising, suffocation results in
no external indications of abuse. 7 Medical literature on suffo-
cation indicates that a person must deprive a child of oxygen for
approximately sixty to eighty seconds before the child loses con-
sciousness, and the entire episode may last two to four min-
utes."s  Prevalence of homicides by suffocation is largely
unknown, but many experts believe it is often overlooked as a
cause of death.5 9
An experienced pathologist may be able to detect subtle
signs of abuse accompanying suffocation, but the act of suffoca-
tion itself produces "no distinct pathologic changes observable
at autopsy."60 It is extremely difficult for a pathologist to cate-
gorically state the cause of death as suffocation in an infant with
6 Chadwick et al., supra note 4, at 321. The Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected
Woodward's contention that the medical evidence presented by defense witnesses
mandated her acquittal. See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277, 1293-94
(Mass. 1998).
'7 See Roy Meadow, Suffocation, Recurrent Apnea, and Sudden Infant Death, 117 J.
PEDiATRics 351 (1990) (documenting 27 cases of intentional suffocation of young
children by their mothers).
m David P. Southall & Martin P. Samuels, Ethical Use of Covert VideotapingforPoten-
tially Life Threatening Child Abuse: A Response to Dr;. Foreman and Farsides, 307 BRrr. MED.
J. 613 (1993). See also FSTMAN & TALAN, supra note 13, at 505 (describing testimony
of Dr. Janice Ophoven who indicated it can take four minutes of suffocation before a
child dies).
A 1997 study provides remarkable videotape documentation of more than 30
parents attempting to injure their children while hospitalized. Of 39 patients for
whom abuse was suspected, 30 patients were videotaped while a caretaker attempted
to suffocate the child in the hospital. The 39 patients had 41 siblings, 12 of whom
had previously died unexpectedly. The intentional nature of suffocation is made
abundantly clear by this report. (Although intervention by hospital staff prevented
harm to the children under surveillance, the ethical problems inherent in this type of
study are numerous, and the authors provide a detailed discussion of these issues).
Southall et al., supra note 35, at 737.
"' See Finkelhor, supra note 19, at 22-23.
60Kirschner & Wilson, supra note 50, at 347.
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no additional injuries. Complicating investigation of suffoca-
tion is the recognized condition of sudden infant death syn-
drome (SIDS). While SIDS presents a true cause of death in
infancy, some pathologists express concern that it is sometimes
used as a ready diagnosis when further investigation might yield
evidence of intentional suffocation.6'
C. BEATING
In addition to shaken baby syndrome and suffocation-
forms of abuse about which most people have little
knowledge-beating remains one of the most common forms of
child physical abuse. Young children with severe head trauma
caused by being beaten or thrown may exhibit external signs of
injuries not usually present in the shaken baby. Head injuries in
children killed by a beating are somewhat different than those
inflicted by shaking but result in the same brain swelling that
leads to death. 62
Children who are severely beaten often have abdominal in-
juries which result in death. Barry and Weber produce a useful
comparison of accidental and non-accidental abdominal inju-
ries reproduced here as Table 1 .63 As this table indicates, inju-
ries to the liver are the most frequent serious abdominal
injury.r Such internal injuries require significant (and often
repeated) beatings such as kicks or punches with a closed fist.0s
61 See Robert M. Reece, Fatal Child Abuse and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome: A Critical
Diagnostic Decision, 91 PimiCs 423 (1993). SIDS is a diagnosis of exclusion, not an
affirmative finding. Thus, a full investigation into the cause of death, including
autopsy, is necessary before a diagnosis of SIDS can be made. See Ga.DINo Er AL.,
supra note 40, at 230-31.
' Bruce, supra note 40, at 119.
Richard C. Barry & Thomas R. Weber, Thoracoabdominal Injuries Associated with
Child Abuse, in CHILD MALTREATMENT: A CuInicAL GUIDE AND RFERENCE 67, 69 (James
A. Monteleone ed., 2d ed. 1998).
Multiple internal organs are likely to be injured with serious beatings, such as





DIFFERENCES IN USUAL PRESENTATION FACTORS IN CHILD ABUSE
VERSUS ACCIDENTAL THORACOABDOMINAL INJURY'
PRESENTATION ACCIDENTAL ABUSE
-FACTOR
Time of presentation Immediate Delayed
after injury
History
Present Available and Often unavailable,
Reliable unreliable, or inconsistent
with the injury
Past Unremarkable Previous abusive
episodes and 50% known to
[protective services]
Age 7.8 years (mean) 2.5 years (mean)
Old inflicted bruises 0% 50% to 90%
Old fractures Very infrequent Frequent
Most frequent Spleen Liver
abdominal organ
injured
Multiple visceral Infrequent Frequent
injuries
Intestinal injury Infrequent Frequent
Death 4.5% to 12.5% 12% to 60%
A Reproduced with permission of the publisher, G.W. Medical Publishing, Inc., St.
Louis, Missouri.
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III. PROSECUTING CHILD HOMICIDE UNDER TRADITIONAL
CHARGING STATUTES
As seen above, child homicide committed by a parent or
other caretaker who suffocates or violently shakes an infant or
young child is among the most difficult to discover and prose-
cute.6 Whether a child dies with many or few external signs of
injury, ajury will rightly ask several questions. Can the death be
explained as an accident? Was the caretaker merely negligent
or was she or he provoked to commit a violent act in the heat of
passion? Was the caretaker so reckless as to manifest an ex-
treme indifference to human life? Did the caretaker know the
child would die as a result of the conduct? Or, perhaps, did the
caretaker intend to kill the child? These are difficult questions
for a trier of fact to answer, with the result often being a rela-
tively low level of punishment or no punishment at all for a
caretaker who kills a child with his or her hands.
This section discusses case law applying homicide statutes to
child victims. Because of the wide variation among statutory
language, the following discussion is organized around the fa-
miliar understanding of murder and manslaughter (rather than
their Model Penal Code equivalent)67 and considers the various
mental state elements required to be proven by statute and case
law.
6SeeAMEPICAN PROSEcuTORs RESEARCH INSITurtE, supra note 8, at 1.
"Although the Model Penal Code's structure is more helpful than the traditional
murder-manslaughter distinction, few of the cases below interpret statutes based on
the Model Penal Code's homicide offenses. I attempt to categorize the various state
approaches under the better known-although less precise-common law terms. See
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part I, §§ 210.0 to 210.6 (1980). LaFave and
Scott provide an extensive discussion of the common law background and prevailing
approaches of the states. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSnN W. SCOTr, SUBSTANTE
CRuMNAL. LAW §§ 7.12 & 7.13, at 276-99 (1986). For a general discussion of criminal
intent and citation of cases in the context of child abuse, including child homicide,
see 1 JOHN E. B. MYERS, EvDENcE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECr CASES § 4.35, at 365-76
(3d ed. 1997). For a partial list of older cases addressing child homicide convictions,
see H.D. Warren, Annotation, Criminal Liability for Excessive or Improper Punishment In-
flicted on Child by Parent, Teacher, or One In Loco Parentis, 89 A.L.R.2D 396, §§ 9-11, 16-
18, 22-23, and 25 (1963).
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A. FIRST DEGREE MURDER
First degree murder-the most serious of the homicide of-
fenses-requires proof of a specific intent to kill after premedi-
tation and deliberation. With premeditation and deliberation
notoriously difficult to define and apply under common murder
scenarios,69 the difficulties are amplified in the context of child
homicides. Nonetheless, numerous first degree murder convic-
tions have been upheld for the killing of children by abuse.
Reported case law of intent to kill murder convictions falls
into two categories. First are cases in which a child has been
battered or tortured over an extended period of time with the
beatings ultimately resulting in the child's death. The facts of
these cases are gruesome, and many courts have little difficulty
inferring7" intent to kill, premeditation, and deliberation from
the numerous external signs of cruel acts to the child's body.'
- See2 LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 67, § 7.7(a), at 237. Other forms of first degree
murder include first degree felony murder and murder by lying in wait, poison, or
torture. Id § 7.7(c), at 242; see also State v. Pierce, 488 S.E.2d 576 (N.C.
1997) (upholding conviction for first degree murder by torture of battered and
shaken baby). These variations are indicated herein when applicable, although many
are excluded from consideration in this article. See infra notes 169-74 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the scope of homicide statutes included in this article.
0 As articulated by LaFave and Scott:
Perhaps the best that canbe said of 'deliberation' is that it requires a cool mind that is
capable of reflection, and of 'premeditation' that it requires that the one with the cool
mind did in fact reflect, at least for a short period of time before his act of killing.
2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 67, §-7.7(a), at 237.
70 For discussion of circumstantial evidence, see infra notes 158-68 and accompany-
ing text.
71 See People v. Mincey, 827 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1992) (five-year-old son of defendant's
girlfriend had hundreds of injuries, some of which caused his intestines to stop work-
ing and others caused his brain to swell); People v. Oaks, 662 N.E.2d 1328 (Ill.
1996) (three-year-old son of defendant's girlfriend died from massive head injuries
and also had numerous other injuries); State v. Rowell, 883 P.2d 1184 (Kan.
1994) (16-month-old daughter died of injuries to internal organs after being subjected
to a long period of abuse); Commonwealth v. Avellar, 622 N.E.2d 625, 632 (Mass.
1993) (number and severity of injuries to six-month-old justified finding of "extreme
atrocity or cruelty"); State v. Elliott, 475 S.E.2d 202 (N.C. 1996) (two-year-old daughter
of defendant's girlfriend had numerous injuries and died of massive head injuries
caused by having her head repeatedly slammed against the floor); State v. Flippen,
477 S.E.2d 158 (N.C. 1996) (defendant's two-year-old stepdaughter with numerous in-
juries died of internal bleeding caused from a torn liver and pancreas); State v. Per-
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For example, Nevada courts have consistently upheld first
degree murder convictions for the death of children by batter-
ing. In Hem v. State,72 the defendant beat to death the three-
year-old son of his girlfriend. The child died from injury to his
liver, and he also had bruises all over his body. The court found
that the "nature and extent of the injuries, coupled with re-
peated blows, constitutes substantial evidence of willfulness,
premeditation, and deliberation, "7s further holding that it must
allow ajury to draw reasonable inferences from evidence such as
this:
Any other result would leave prosecutors, defenders and judges without
guidance in such cases. If the result were to the contrary, then absent di-
rect evidence of premeditation, a first degree murder conviction would
be most difficult, if not impossible, to obtain if the victim is a child who
has not been killed with a gun or other dangerous weapon-but severely
beaten, as in the instant case.
Other courts examining cases with comparably horrifying
facts have refused to find a premeditated intent to kill and have
lowered jury convictions to second degree murder or man-
slaughter.7 For example, in Midgett v. State,76 the defendant en-
due, 357 S.E.2d 345 (N.C. 1987) (one-month-old infant with multiple bruises and frac-
tures died of blunt force trauma to the head); Archie v. Commonwealth, 420 S.E.2d
718 (Va. Ct. App. 1992)(three-year-old daughter of defendant's boyfriend suffered
massive head trauma, a fractured arm and wrist, and abdominal injuries).
635 P.2d 278 (Nev. 1981).
Id. at 281.
"' Id See also Athey v. State, 797 P.2d 956 (Nev. 1990) (28-month-old son of defen-
dant's girlfriend died of severe head injuries caused by shaking or blunt trauma and
had numerous other bruises).
See State v. Carpenter, 570 A.2d 203, 207 n.4 (Conn. 1990) (murder conviction
lowered to manslaughter--defined as "evincing an extreme indifference to human
life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another
person"-because defendant's act of throwing child into a bathtub did not by itself
prove a specific intent to kill required for second degree murder); Massie v. State, 553
P.2d 186, 190 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (court held evidence that four-year-old had
numerous injuries and died of head injuries insufficient to support murder commit-
ted with a "premeditated intent and design to effect the death" of the victim); State v.
Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 537 (Tenn. 1992) (defendant's infliction of massive head in-
juries, multiple internal injuries, an untreated broken bone, bruises to his genitals
and extremities, and numerous other injuries insufficient to support first degree
murder because the evidence failed to prove premeditation and deliberation); State
v. Bordis, 905 S.W.2d 214, 224 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (court held failure to feed
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gaged in a course of brutal beatings of his eight-year-old son, ul-
timately killing him with blows to his abdomen and chest.7 The
court examined the history of the law defining premeditation
and deliberation and concluded that beatings with the hands
were not comparable to attacks with other "deadly weapons,"
the use of which justifies a finding of intent to kill. Likewise, the
court held that findings of the extent of injuries do not in them-
selves demonstrate premeditation and deliberation.7 As such,
the court reduced the defendant's first degree murder convic-
tion to second degree murder, in effect finding that parents
could not be convicted of first degree murder for the beating
death of their child unless they articulated to someone in ad-
vance their "premeditation" and "deliberation."7
A second category of first degree murder cases consists of
those in which few, if any, external signs of abuse to a child's
body exist. Typically these cases involve suffocation or a violent
shaking of a child who is not otherwise battered. While not
common, some courts have upheld first degree murder convic-
three-month-old child who died from malnutrition and dehydration did not in itself
show an intent to kill as there were other "reasonable interpretations of [defendant's]
inaction").
76 729 S.W.2d 410 (Ark. 1987).
Id. at 411. The court described his injuries:
There were recently caused bruises on the lips, center of the chest plate, and forehead
as well as on the back part of the lateral chest wall, the soft tissue near the spine, and the
buttocks. There was discoloration of the abdominal wall and prominent bruising on the
palms of the hands. Older bruises were found on the right temple, under the chin, and
on the left mandible. Recent as well as older, healed, rib fractures were found.
Id. The court also noted that at his death, the child was "very poorly nourished." id.
7 Id at 413. In its reasoning, the court stated:
The appellant argues, and we must agree, that in a case of child abuse of long du-
ration the jury could well infer that the perpetrator comes not to expect death of the
child from his action, but rather that the child will live so that the abuse may be admin-
istered again and again. Had the appellant planned his son's death, he could have ac-
complished it in a previous beating.
Id. The dissent countered that the majority's "clairvoyance" ignored the jury's evalua-
tion that, after considering all the facts, it determined the acts were committed with
the intent to kill the child. Id. at 416 (Hickman,J., dissenting).
See id. at 415 (finding the defendant's "obvious" purpose was to cause serious
physical injury to the child, not death).
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tions in suffocation and shaken baby cases.80 For example, in
United States v. Curry,s the defendant was tried for the premedi-
tated murder of two of his sons, one killed by asphyxiation in
1976 and the other by shaking in 1987. Defendant was jointly
tried for both incidents and convicted of premeditated murder
for both acts.2 Even though this case is unusual in that the de-
fendant killed two children, the facts identified by the court as
supporting an inference of premeditation are not unusual: "the
extraordinarily violent nature of the shaking, appellant's de-
meanor at the hospital, the prior abuse on the child, and appel-
lant's medically nonsensical account of the events."83 Similarly,
the court found "more than sufficient" circumstantial evidence
to prove the manner of death of the first child: "evidence tend-
ing to prove his threats, boasts, admissions, motive, and de-
meanor, coupled with his change of story, destruction of
evidence, and prior abuse."4
B. MALICE, DEPRAVED HEART, AND FELONY MURDER
The next most serious homicide offense is a killing in which
the actor intends to inflict serious bodily injury but does not
necessarily intend to kill the victim. This is common law mur-
der, commonly defined as the unlawful killing of another with
malice aforethought.8 Whether phrased with the common law
terminology or the Model Penal Code formulation, the essence
of this offense is an act in which the defendant knows or should
know the conduct will result in death or serious bodily injury.
A representative murder case involving a child victim is Web-
ber v. Commonwealth.8 In Webber, the Commonwealth presented
o See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973) (eight-month-old
suffocated by foster mother); United States v. Curry, 31 M.J. 359 (C.M.A. 1990) (14-
week-old shaken to death and 10-month-old asphyxiated by their father); Curtis v.
State, 568 P.2d 583 (Nev. 1977) (two-year-old died of head trauma).
" 31 M.J. 359 (C.M.A. 1990).
82 Id. at 360.
"Id. at 372 (describing evidence regarding the second child).
' "Malice aforethought" means a defendant was aware or practically certain that
his conduct would result in death or serious bodily injury. 2 LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra
note 67, § 7.1, at 181.
m496 S.E.2d 83 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
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evidence of bruises on the infant victim's face and ribs and the
testimony of an expert that brain injuries to the child were
caused by a violent shaking.87 The Commonwealth also pre-
sented testimony of admissions by the defendant that he be-
came frustrated with the baby and slapped and shook him
(though not, according to the defendant, hard enough to kill
the baby).ss The Virginia Court of Appeals found the "brutality"
of the assault supported a finding of malice.89 Numerous child
homicide prosecutions in the United States have been upheld
under a similar definition.9°
87 Id. at 89.
88Id.
"9 Id. at 90. Using similar reasoning, one of the first cases to recognize that an
adult can shake an infant to death was Regina v. Ward, 1 All E.R. 565 (Q.B. 1956). An
adult man admitted shaking an 18-month-old child violently after being frustrated by
the child's crying. Id. at 566. The defendant argued that his subjective state of mind
should be the standard by which murder should be defined. The court disagreed,
holding that the proper standard is whether "a reasonable man would have contem-
plated death or grievous bodily harm was likely to result" from the conduct. Id. at
566-67.
'0 See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 38 M.J. 717 (A.C.M.R. 1993) (defendant's con-
viction for unpremeditated murder upheld in the battering death of his six-month-
old son); Corbett v. State, 468 S.E.2d 757 (Ga. 1996) (battered eight-month-old died
of asphyxia); King v. State, 448 S.E.2d 362 (Ga. 1994) ("malice murder" conviction
upheld for death to 15-month-old caused by blunt force trauma to the head); People
v. Tye, 565 N.E.2d 931 (Ill. 1990) (defendant beat his three-year-old daughter to
death); People v. Ward, 463 N.E.2d 696 (I1. 1984) (defendant beat to death four-year-
old child of his girlfriend); Powers v. State, 696 N.E.2d 865 (Ind. 1998) (defendant in-
flicted fatal head injuries upon his five-month-old nephew); Anderson v. State, 681
N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 1997) (defendant beat to death 21-month-old child of his girl-
friend); Robinson v. State, 453 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. 1983) (three-year-old child of defen-
dant's cousin killed by defendant and her husband who kicked and threw the child
against a chair); Shipley v. State, 620 N.E.2d 710 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (mother and fa-
ther convicted of murdering their five-year-old daughter from a combination of blunt
force trauma, dehydration, and malnutrition); State v. Morton, 638 P.2d 928 (Kan.
1982) (two-year-old died from head injuries); Commonwealth v. Azar, 588 N.E.2d
1352 (Mass. Ct. App. 1992) (defendant killed his four-month-old daughter with blunt
force trauma to the head); People v. Biggs, 509 N.W.2d 803 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993) (mother convicted of suffocating two-year-old son); State v. Candela, 929
S.W.2d 852 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (defendant killed four and one-half-year-old daughter
of her boyfriend by inflicting severe head injuries); State v. Ballenger, 738 P.2d 1291
(Mont. 1987) (defendant acted knowingly and purposefully in the beating death of a
child); State v. Sigler, 688 P.2d 749 (Mont. 1984) (proof of specific intent to kill is not
required under deliberate homicide statute; child died of blows to the abdomen);
State v. Galloway, 628 A.2d 735 (NJ. 1993) (court did not rule on the sufficiency of
the evidence in this shaken baby case, but indicated the record supported a charge
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Although few reported opinions expressly reverse the
equivalent of second degree murder convictions based on insuf-
ficiency of the evidence, 9' the Louise Woodward case provides a
stark example of the difficulties in obtaining murder convic-
tions of a caretaker who violently kills an infant. 2 The verdict of
the Woodwardjury indicates its agreement with the prosecution's
assertion that the defendant's violent shaking and slamming of
the eight-month-old victim caused fatal brain injuries. The ver-
dict also indicates the jury considered the defendant to have
acted with malice.3 However, under the authority of a Massa-
and instruction on purposeful and knowing murder); People v. Shattel, 578 N.Y.S.2d
694 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992)(head injuries to a three-month-old constituted "reckless
murder"); State v. Qualls, 502 S.E.2d 31 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (sufficient evidence that
defendant acted with malice in severely shaking his two-month-old son); State v.
Hemphill, 409 S.E.2d 744 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (sufficient evidence that. defendant
acted with malice in shaking to death his four-month-old daughter); Barcenes v.
State, 940 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (19-month-old died of massive head inju-
ries); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 773 (Utah 1991) (evidence of motive and plans to
dispose of the child constitutes sufficient basis to infer intent to kill); State v. Olsen,
680 A.2d 107 (Vt. 1996) (boyfriend shook two-year-old daughter of his girlfriend; vic-
tim also sustained severe abdominal injuries from punching or kicking); State v.
Brunell, 615 A.2d 127 (Vt. 1992) (father suffocated or shook 20-month-old daughter);
Webber v. Commonwealth, 496 S.E.2d 83 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (one-month-old shaken
to death).
The above cases do not include those involving serious physical abuse that do not
result in the death of the child. Such cases involve many of the same issues of proof
of intent, criminal act, and criminal agency. See, e.g., Powell v. State, 487 S.E.2d 424
(Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (conviction for aggravated assault and simple battery upheld
against child care provider who caused total blindness and permanent brain damage
to an 11-month-old by violently shaking the child); People v. Goodridge, 674 N.Y.S.2d
24 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (defendant's act of shaking a three-month-old constituted
"the kind of recklessness involving a depraved indifference to human life" for pur-
poses of first degree assault).
"1 This may be in part because cases often are decided on grounds other than the
sufficiency of the evidence, and in part because few cases are charged as murder in
the first place. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Of course, courts reverse
murder convictions on many other grounds, some of which give insights into the
court's view of the evidence. One of the most likely issues resulting in reversal of
murder cases is failure to give an instruction on a lesser included offense. See, e.g., Al-
len v. State, 546 So. 2d 1009 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (child died of blunt force trauma
to the head; court found evidence warranted manslaughter instruction); Baker v.
State, 569 N.E.2d 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing murder conviction in shaken
baby case because no involuntary manslaughter instruction was given).
"For additional discussion of the facts of this case, see supra notes 1-4 and accom-
panying text.
* Malice was defined by the trial judge as: "(a) an intentional act (b) which in cir-
cumstances known to the defendant (c) created what a reasonably prudent person
1999
558 CHARLES A. P-IPPS [Vol. 89
chusetts rule allowing a trial judge to reduce a jury verdict "for
any reason that justice may require,"94 the judge determined that
the defendant's conduct was "most fairly characterized as man-
slaughter" and lowered the conviction to manslaughter.9 5 The
Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the judge's actions, al-
though its ruling did not amount to a decision that there was in-
sufficient evidence to support a murder conviction.
96
Another standard used to define murder in some jurisdic-
tions is an act committed under circumstances manifesting an
extreme indifference to the value of human life.97 This termi-
nology is a modem variation of the well-known common law of-
fense of depraved heart murder,98 which has been used in
would have known was (according to common experience) a plain and strong likeli-
hood that death would result." Commonwealth v. Woodward, 7 Mass. L. Rep. 449,
450, 1997 WL 694119 at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov 10, 1997) (emphasis added).
Id. at 451, 1997 WL 694119 at *4 (emphasis in original).
9- Id. at 453, 1997 WL 694119 at *8.
9Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277 (Mass. 1998). See MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 278, § 11 (1997); MASS. R. CIM. P. 25(b) (2) (1997). Under the Massachusetts
scheme, ajudge may lower a verdict "even if the evidence warrants the jury's verdict."
Woodward, 694 N.E.2d at 1284. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the trial
judge did not abuse this broad discretion in lowering the jury's murder conviction to
manslaughter even though he found sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict.
Id. at 1288. The appellate court specifically declined to "conduct an independent
analysis" of the evidence, reviewing only whether the judge "abused his discretion or
committed an error of law." Id. at 1285. Finding that he did not abuse his discretion,
the court allowed his decisions on conviction and sentencing to stand. Id. at 1288.
Thus, the Woodward decision does not have the same effect as reversing a conviction
based on insufficient evidence.
The trial judge as well directly ruled that "the verdict ... was not against the
weight of the evidence." Woodward, 7 Mass. L. Rep. at 450, 1997 WL 694119 at *3.
The judge stated that under Massachusetts law, his holding as to the sufficiency of the
evidence was a legal one in which he was required to assume that the jury discarded
"every scrap" of defense evidence. Id. at 449-50, *2. Looking solely at the prosecu-
tion's evidence, the judge held the jury could reasonably convict the defendant of
murder. Id. His act of lowering the verdict was a decision that assessed the defen-
dant's culpability and the broader interests ofjustice. See id. at 451-52, *5-*6.
7The "extreme indifference" language was proposed by the Model Penal Code.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b). See also 2 LAFAVE & ScOTr, supra note 67, §
7.4(a), at 201 (indicating that the Model Penal Code formulation has been "substan-
tially followed by many but not all of the modem codes," and that a "significant mi-
nority" of states do not recognize this offense at all); Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation,
Validity and Construction of "Extreme Indifferene" Murder Statute, 7 A.L.R.5TH 758 (1992
& Supp. 1998).
'a See 2 LAFAVE & ScOTr, supra note 67, § 7.4, at 199-206 (discussing depraved heart
murder). See also Dale R. Agthe, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute Defin-
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numerous prosecutions for the death of a child. For example,
in State v. Blubaugh9 a fourteen-month-old girl, Faith, was killed
by her mother's boyfriend. The court described the conduct of
the defendant that resulted in the child's death:
[A witness] testified that when Faith was "fussy," defendant's habit was to
place her in the "fetal position"---head in the crook of one elbow, but-
tocks in the hand of the same arm. He would then put his other arm
behind her knees, fold her knees to the chest, compress her body tightly,
and hold her eyes shut with his fingertips. If Faith screamed or at-
tempted to arch her body out of this position, [the witness] said that de-
fendant would "squeeze her tighter until her face turned red and then
she couldn't breathe very well."100
Medical testimony indicated the victim died of brain and
vertebral injuries: "Specifically, her skull was fractured, her scalp
was bruised in several places, and the instraspinous ligaments in
her upper back were torn apart. The cause of Faith's death was
anoxia (deprivation of oxygen to the brain) caused either by the
skull injury or the back injury."1'1
Analyzing the case under Utah's depraved indifference
murder statute, the court held that the jury could reasonably
have found that evidence of the defendant's hitting the child or
tightly squeezing the child caused her death, and that he knew
ing Homicide by Conduct Manifesting )"eraved Indifference, " 25 A.L.R.4TH 311, §§ 3,4, 5,
8, and 10[a] (1983 & Supp. 1997) (discussing child abuse prosecutions under the de-
praved indifference standard).
"904 P.2d 688 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (depraved heart murder upheld against de-
fendant who killed a 14-month-old child by inflicting blunt force injuries).
'0' Id. at 692.
'o' Id. at 693.
'02 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-208(1) (c) (1995). The court identified the following
elements:
(1) engaging in conduct creating a grave risk of death to another that resulted in
the death of that individual (the 'actus reus'); (2) knowing that this conduct or the cir-
cumstances surrounding this conduct created a grave risk of death to this individual
(the 'mens rea'); and (3) acting 'under circumstances evidencing a depraved indiffer-
ence to human life'--a qualitative judgment to be made by the jury in determining the
extent of the defendant's conduct. It is not a description of the mens rea involved in
the commission of the crime, but an evaluation of the actus reus.
Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 694.
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this conduct created a grave risk of death. Finally, the court
held the jury reasonably could have found the defendant acted
with depraved indifference, demonstrating "unmitigated wick-
edness, extreme inhumanity or... a high degree of wanton-
ness."'
03
The final murder doctrine is felony murder-the killing of
another while in the course of committing a felony. The of-
fense may be the equivalent of first or second degree murder,
depending on the statutory scheme.' T Prosecutors have long
been able to proceed under general felony murder principles in
jurisdictions in which underlying felonies are not enumerated.
Thus, if a person kills a child while committing a felonious bat-
tery, many prosecutors have been able to prosecute the child's
death as felony murder.105
103 Id. at 696 (quoting State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214, 1220 (Utah 1985)). The
Bolsinger court also described depraved heart murder as "a knowing doing of an un-
called-for act in callous disregard of its likely harmful effect on a victim, which is so
heinous as to be equivalent to a 'specific intent' to kill." Bolsinger, 699 P.2d at 1220.
104 See2 LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 67, § 7.7(b), at 241.
103 See, e.g., Worden v. State, 603 So. 2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (nine-month-
old beaten to death; underlying offense of aggravated battery); Isaac v. State, 440
S.E.2d 175 (Ga. 1994) (felony murder conviction for beating death of three-year-old);
Bethea v. State, 304 S.E.2d 713 (Ga. 1983) (two-year-old died of blows to the stomach;
underlying felony of cruelty to children applied); Woodrum v. State, 498 N.E.2d 1318
(Ind. Ct. App.'1986) (two-year-old died of blunt force trauma to the abdomen; battery
was the predicate offense to an involuntary manslaughter conviction); State v.
Hughes, 457 N.W.2d 25, 28-29 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (eight-month-old killed by violent
shaking; underlying offense of felonious child endangerment); State v. Pierce, 488
S.E.2d 576 (N.C. 1997) (two and one-half-year-old killed by violent shaking; underly-
ing offenses of torture and felony child abuse); State v. Wilcox, 441 N.W.2d 209 (S.D.
1989) (battered two-year-old died of blows to the abdomen; underlying offense of
child abuse), remanded for resentencing, Wilcox v. Leapley, 488 N.W.2d 654 (S.D. 1992).
Some states have statutes that on first glance appear to be felony murder statutes,
but in fact maintain a requirement of proof of the traditional intent elements of
murder. For example, Michigan expressly requires proof of malice by both statute
and case law. See MsCH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.316 (West Supp. 1998) (first degree
murder includes murder when committed in the course of child abuse); People v.
Dumas, 563 N.W.2d 31, 34-35 (Mich. 1997) (discussing the abolition of common law
felony murder in Michigan and the retention of an element requiring proof of homi-
cidal intent). Iowa requires proof of "malice aforethought" even under felony mur-
der prosecutions. See State v. Rhode, 503 N.W.2d 27, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993), af'd,
Rhode v. Olk-Long, 77 F.3d 113, 118 (8th Cir. 1996). See also NEV. REv. STAT. §
200.030 (1997).
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C. MANSLAUGHTER
Manslaughter is commonly divided into voluntary and in-
voluntary manslaughter, with few appearances of voluntary
manslaughter appearing in child homicide cases since a convic-
tion for voluntary manslaughter typically requires proof of an
unlawful killing committed in the heat of passion upon provoca-
tion?°6 Courts uniformly hold that a child's behavior cannot
provoke a fatal response from a reasonable person. °7 As stated
by the Georgia Supreme Court, "[I]t is nearly impossible to
conceive of a situation in which a two-year-old child could pro-
voke a reasonable person to kill, requiring a charge on volun-
tary manslaughter."'O°
A few states define a crime of voluntary manslaughter as an
unlawful killing "in the heat of passion" or with "wanton disre-
gard for the value of human life," but do not include an ele-
ment of provocation. Convictions under this standard are
upheld in reported case law.19
'062 LAFAVE & ScOrr, supra note 67, § 7.10 at 252.
'"See, e.g., Isaac v. State, 440 S.E.2d 175, 178 (Ga. 1994) (failure to give jury a vol-
untary manslaughter instruction was not error because a child cannot provoke); Pow-
ers v. State, 696 N.E.2d 865 (Ind. 1998) (crying of five-month-old cannot constitute
provocation); Patterson v. State, 532 N.E.2d 604 (Ind. 1988) (child wetting bed was
not provocation); Robinson v. State, 453 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. 1983) (child wetting the
bed "is clearly not sufficient provocation" to justify lowering murder conviction to
voluntary manslaughter); State v. Broseman, 947 S.W.2d 520, 527 (Mo. Ct. App.
1997) ("We hold categorically and emphatically that an infant's crying is not 'ade-
quate cause'" to incite a sudden passion voluntary manslaughter.). Cf. State v. Taylor,
452 N.W.2d 605 (Iowa 1990) (error for trial court to find a child provoked defen-
dant's response, but defendant cannot complain of court's error that worked to his
advantage since there was adequate evidence to support a second degree murder
conviction).
'a' Isaac, 440 S.E.2d at 178. In upholding a murder conviction, the court indicated
that simply because a person acts in the "heat of passion" does not mean the act can-
not constitute murder
It is a mistake to suppose that if one kill another in the heat of passion, that such
killing cannot be murder. Every man is responsible to the community for the control of
his temper, and if for some small provocation he permits himself to get into a fury and
kills a human being, it is murder. There must be provocation such as justifies the ex-
citement of passion [for the act to constitute voluntary manslaughter].
Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 49 Ga. 482, 485 (1873)).
'" See, e.g., State v. Olson, 459 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (six-week-old
shaken baby); Baker v. State, 455 So. 2d 770, 773 (Miss. 1984) (killing of five-week-old
CHARLES A. PHIPPS
A common verdict in child homicide cases is one which re-
quires only proof of a low degree of culpability, most commonly
described as criminal negligence, resulting in the crime of in-
voluntary manslaighter.10 Criminal negligence indicates the
actor is engaged in conduct creating a "high degree of risk of
death or serious bodily injury," and the actor is aware of the
risk."' The most common examples of this crime are deaths
caused by negligent operation of a motor vehicle or reckless use
of a weapon.
When children are victims of fatal child abuse, an involun-
tary manslaughter conviction is a common result,"3 presumably
because juries (and judges) are convinced an adult committed a
culpable act but find it hard to believe the person acted with
such violence that they knew or should have known their con-
duct would kill or seriously injure the child.14 Numerous cases
uphold involuntary manslaughter or negligent homicide convic-
dos115tions.
u
by infliction of head trauma demonstrated "wanton disregard of the safety of human
life"); State v. Compton, 701 A.2d 468 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), cert. denied,
State v. Compton, 707 A.2d 154 (NJ. 1998) (first degree aggravated manslaughter for
killing four-month-old son by shaking); People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845, 847
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (first degree manslaughter conviction upheld in beating death
of six-year-old; offense defined as causing the death of another while acting with in-
tent to cause serious physical injury); State v. Wilcox, 441 N.W.2d 209, 213 (S.D.
1989) (two-year-old killed by blows to the abdomen; the act was committed "in the
heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner").
,,' The Model Penal Code classifies the common law crime of involuntary man-
slaughter as negligent homicide. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.4
(1980).
' 2 LAFAVE & SCOTt, supra note 67, § 7.12(a) at 278.
112 Id. at 281.
"' Although no statistics are available to confirm involuntary manslaughter as the
offense most likely to result in conviction in child homicide cases, many child abuse
prosecutors believe this to be the case. See U.S. DEF'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
supra note 5, at 43 ("The Board heard the testimony of prosecutors who conceded
that charges of child homicides, including heinous cases, are routinely reduced to
lesser crimes.")
"' See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277 (Mass. 1998) (Greaney, J.,
dissenting in part) ("Here, it appears that the judge identified himself with [the de-
fendant's] cause, compromising the public's confidence in the integrity and imparti-
ality of our courts.").
"" See State v. Ojeda, 810 P.2d 1148 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) (shaken baby syndrome);
McClaskey v. State, 540 N.E.2d 41 (Ind. 1989) (shaken baby syndrome; reckless homi-
cide); People v. Barnwell, 230 N.W.2d 400 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (brain injuries);
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D. COMMON CHALLENGES ARISING UNDER TRADITIONAL
CHARGING STATUTES
1. Lesser Included Offenses
The doctrine of lesser included offenses requires a jury be
instructed of any offenses less serious than, but included within,
the one charged that could be borne out by the evidence."6 De-
termining whether an offense is lesser included within another
is a two-step" process. The first step is a legal determination of
whether all the elements of the lesser offense are included in
the greater offense. The second step is a factual determination
of whether the evidence in the individual case warrants an in-
struction.1
7
While some courts hold involuntary manslaughter is not a
lesser offense of murder, most courts require an involuntary
manslaughter instruction when a defendant is prosecuted for
murder."8 Analysis of an involuntary manslaughter conviction
in the context of a child homicide is exemplified by the Mis-
State v. Frappier, 941 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (asphyxiation; involuntary man-
slaughter); State v. Mergenthaler, 868 P.2d 560, 563 (Mont. 1994) (shaken baby, neg-
ligent homicide); People v. Manon, 640 N.Y.S.2d 318 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (death
caused by dehydration; negligent homicide); People v. Hawkins-Rusch, 623 N.Y.S.2d
465 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (shaken baby; negligent homicide); People v. Johnstone,
536 N.Y.S.2d 283 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (shaken baby; second degree manslaughter);
State v. Morgan, 865 P.2d 1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (lacerated liver;, manslaughter).
See also supra note 109 (citing cases in which murder convictions were lowered to
manslaughter).
"6 For an exhaustive discussion of lesser included offenses and associated constitu-
tional doctrines, see James A. Shellenberger &James A. Strazzella, The Lesser Included
Offense Doctrine and the Constitution: The Development of Due Process and Double Jeopardy
Remedies, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1995). Shellenberger & Strazzella define the doctrine:
[A] criminal defendant may be convicted at trial of any crime supported by the evi-
dence which is less than, but included within, the offense charged by the prosecution.
In a jury trial, the trial judge instructing the jury on all possible verdicts under the
charges must include all lesser included offenses warranted by the evidence.
Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
"1 See id. at 6-13, for a discussion of the intricacies of the doctrine.
"a See, e.g., Allen v. State, 546 So. 2d 1009, 1010 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (error for
court to refuse a manslaughter instruction because the evidence could have sup-
ported a theory of reckless manslaughter). Cf. State v. Tamalini, 953 P.2d 450, 452-53
(Wash. 1998) (holding first and second degree manslaughter not lesser included of-
fenses of felony murder).
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souri Court of Appeals in State v. Ponder.119 In Ponder, a two and
one-half-year-old boy died from brain injuries inflicted either by
a violent shaking with impact or a blow to the head. Although
the defendant was charged with murder, the trial court directed
the jury to consider only the lesser charge of involuntary man-
slaughter, and while instructing the jury on the elements of the
offense stated:
[A] person acts recklessly as to causing the death of another person
when there is a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he will cause death
and he consciously disregards that risk, and such disregard is a gross de-
viation from what a reasonable person would do in the circumstances.12
The defendant argued that, due to the violent nature of the
prosecution's theory of the case, the jury should not be charged
as to a recklessness standard: "In Defendant's words, 'One can-
not beat a child "recklessly" in the legal sense.'" 121 The defen-
dant sought dismissal on the grounds of insufficient evidence
for either murder or manslaughter. The court rejected the de-
fendant's argument, holding that the jury reasonably could have
inferred that the defendant became frustrated with the child,
hit him on the head or shook him, and in so doing consciously
disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he would
cause the child's death, but did not intend to cause the death or
to inflict serious bodily injury.
1 22
An instruction on a lesser offense is not necessary unless
evidence exists to support the lesser offense. Thus, in State v.
Williams,'2 the defendant was convicted of first degree felony
murder and the Kansas Supreme Court held evidence of the
underlying felony child abuse was so strong that it was unneces-
sary to instruct on the lesser offenses of unintentional second
degree murder or involuntary manslaughter.12 4 The victim in
"9 950 S.W.2d 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
'" Id. at 907 (citation omitted).
121 Id
' Id. at 909.
947 P.2d 25 (Kan. 1997).
I d. at 28-29. See also People v. Ward, 463 N.E.2d 696, 746-47 (Ill. 1984) (no error
for court to refuse involuntary manslaughter instruction since the severity of the beat-
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Williams was a three-year-old girl who weighed only twenty-three
pounds and died of massive head injuries which physicians indi-
cated were caused by "severe repetitive beating and shaking in a
violent manner." 125 She had bruises on her forehead and the
back of her head, a five inch fracture to the back of her skull,
and additional older bruises and fractures. The defendant ad-
mitted to shaking the child but denied that the shaking killed
her. The court held that when a person is convicted of felony
murder, an instruction on a lesser included offense is necessary
only when the evidence of the underlying felony is weak or in-
conclusive. The court found that the evidence of the underly-
ing felony of child abuse in this case was strong and so an
instruction on unintentional murder or involuntary manslaugh-
ter was not required.
A request for a lesser included instruction may be made
by either the defendant or the prosecutor, and, so long as it is
supported by the evidence, the request should be granted. The
defense strategy unsuccessfully attempted in Commonwealth v.
Woodward1 26 demonstrates this doctrine in a somewhat unique
ing demonstrated the killing was not simply a reckless act); Anderson v. State, 681
N.E.2d 703, 709 (Ind. 1997) (where defendant severely beat a 21-month-old child to
death, "the jury could not conclude that the lesser offense was committed [involun-
tary manslaughter or negligent homicide] but not the greater"); Martin v. State, 535
N.E.2d 493, 496 (Ind. 1989) (head injuries; involuntary manslaughter instruction not
necessary when defense is accident); Wedmore v. State, 519 N.E.2d 546, 546-47, 549
(Ind. 1988) (head injuries; involuntary manslaughter instruction not required); State
v. Carr, 963 P.2d 421, 432 (Kan. 1998) (instruction on lesser degrees of homicide not
required when there was no evidence the injuries were not the product of intentional
battering or shaking); State v. Altum, 941 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Kan. 1997) (instruction for
second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter not required in prosecution for
first degree felony murder when facts indicated defendant killed 14-month-old child
either by shaking or by violent blows to the head); State v. Ballenger, 738 P.2d 1291,
1294 (Mont. 1987) (instruction for aggravated assault or felony assault not required
when defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide after beating child to death);
Barcenes v. State, 940 S.W.2d 739, 746-47 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (instruction on invol-
untary manslaughter and negligent homicide not required when victim died of mas-
sive head injuries and there was no evidence of "conscious risk taking" by defendant
tojustify an instruction on the lesser offenses). But see Baker v. State, 569 N.E.2d 369,
372 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (court distinguished prior case law on the grounds that the
facts of this case-a shaken baby case-could allow an inference that the act was in-
tended only to hurt the child, and therefore an involuntary manslaughter instruction
was necessary).
2' Williams, 947 P.2d at 27.
'" 694 N.E.2d 1277 (Mass. 1998).
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manner. Louise Woodward was indicted for murder and at the
close of the evidence the judge gave first and second degree
murder instructions to the jury. The prosecution also requested
an instruction on involuntary manslaughter but the defendant
objected, requesting that the jury not be instructed on the lesser
offense.'2 The trial judge accepted the defense argument and
refused to give the lesser offense even though the defendant's
mental state was a disputed fact.12
The state Supreme Court found this to be error, holding
that so long as the evidence warrants the instruction, the state
has a right to a jury instruction on lesser included offenses re-
gardless of whether a defendant wants the instruction.'2 In fact,
the court stated it could find no jurisdiction that allows a defen-
dant "to veto a lesser included offense instruction properly re-
quested by the prosecution."'" The Woodward dissent was even
more direct in its objection to the trial judge's ruling:
Woodward pressed for those choices despite having full knowledge that
her strategic decision might be rejected by the jury. Woodward's tactics,
with the judge's approbation, transformed the trial from a search for the
truth to a high stakes game of chance. In a phrase, Woodward brought
the results on herself. There is much force in the Commonwealth's ar-
gument that the judge's actions appear 'to have manipulated the trial's
outcome and marginalized the jury, all to Woodward's benefit.'
1 31
2. Merger
States that do not specify the underlying felonies required
to support a conviction of felony murder may encounter the
merger doctrine. Some courts unhappy with broad felony mur-
der statutes or common law definitions have added limitations
to avoid illogical results. For example, if taken literally, felony
murder statutes would allow elevation of manslaughter to felony
murder because the underlying offense of manslaughter is a
"V Id. at 1282.
129 &
& at 1283.
I& at 1283 n.8 (listing cases).
I S at 1299 (Greaney, J., dissenting in part) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at
1288, which was restating a prosecution argument).
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felony. To avoid this result, courts have imposed two require-
ments. First, the underlying felony must be inherently danger-
ous. Second, the underlying felony must be sufficiently distinct
from homicide so as to constitute a separate offense. If the un-
derlying felony is not sufficiently distinct, it merges with felony
murder and thus cannot act as the underlying offense.'-"
In child abuse cases, the question has arisen whether felony
child abuse is sufficiently distinct from homicide to avoid the
merger doctrine. In State v. Lucas,'3 the Kansas Supreme
Court held felony child abuse was not sufficiently distinct and,
therefore, it merged with felony murder. The court held that
"when a child dies from an act of assaultive conduct, evidence of
prior acts of abuse cannot be used to escalate the charge into
felony murder. Such acts could be used as additional counts of
abuse of a child but the prosecutorial device of charging multi-
ple acts of abuse of a child in one count cannot bootstrap into a
felony-murder charge. ""
After the Kansas legislature amended the statute to clarify
that.the offenses were separate,' the statute was once again
challenged, and the court upheld use of child abuse as the fel-
ony underlying the state's felony murder statute.3 7 Once again
the statute was attacked, this time on the grounds that it violated
double jeopardy by imposing two separate punishments for the
" See generally State v. Campos, 921 P.2d 1266 (N.M. 1996) (discussing the ap-
proaches of various jurisdictions). The merger doctrine also appears when a person
is convicted both of a homicide offense other than felony murder and a felony child
abuse offense. The question in such cases is whether the two offenses merge for pur-
poses of doublejeopardy. Courts differ in their conclusions, but even those applying
a merger doctrine in these circumstances simply vacate the underlying felony child
abuse conviction-the homicide conviction stands. See White v. State, 569 A.2d 1271
(Md. 1990). See also infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
- See Massie v. State, 553 P.2d 186, 191 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (felony of child
beating merged into homicide). But see Schultz v. State, 749 P.2d 559, 561-62 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1988) (finding legislative amendment to child homicide statute changed
the Massie opinion and eliminated the merger problem). Cf State v. Rhode, 503
N.W.2d 27,40 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the merger doctrine altogether in child
homicide prosecution).
" 759 P.2d 90 (Kan. 1988).
"' Id. at 99.
" KaN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3401, 21-3436 (1995).
"s State v. Hupp, 809 P.2d 1207 (Kan. 1991).
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same act. In State v. Smallwood,13 the Kansas Supreme Court
agreed, in part, holding that imposition of punishment for both
child homicide and the underlying felony child abuse violates
double jeopardy when there is only one act.'" However, the
court required only that the lesser conviction be dismissed since
the language of the statute made clear that the legislature in-
tended a person who kills a child while committing child abuse
to be convicted of murder.
4 0
3. Accomplice Liability and Failure to Protect
In some cases there arises the difficult question of the iden-
tity of the person who caused the fatal injuries. Especially when
multiple caretakers are home during the incident, there may be
no means of proving which caretaker inflicted the injuries.14 In
other cases both caretakers can be charged, one as the principal
and one as an accessory.142
Some jurisdictions allow the prosecution of a caretaker who
does not inflict the blows on the basis of the caretaker's legal
duty to protect the child and the failure of the caretaker to re-
move the child from an abusive environment. For example, in
Boone v. State,143 the mother of a four-year-old was convicted of
second degree murder for failing to stop beatings of her son by
her boyfriend.4 4 The court agreed with the prosecution that the
" 955 P.2d 1209 (Kan. 1998).
"'Id. at 1228.
140 d.
"' For example, in People v. Wong, 619 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1993), a husband and
wife were providing 24-hour child care for a three-month-old child. The child died
during the night while in the care of the husband and wife, and medical evidence in-
dicated the child was a victim of violent shaking. The prosecution charged both hus-
band and wife with homicide and endangering the welfare of a child on the theory
that one of them committed the act and the other failed to obtain medical care.
While agreeing that this theory was a plausible one, the appellate court reversed, find-
ing insufficient evidence for convicting the "passive" defendant for failing to seek
medical care. Id. at 381-82. Since the other actor could not be determined, the court
reversed both convictions. Id. at 382-83. See a/.oJohnson v. State, 506 S.E.2d 374 (Ga.
1998) (evidence failed to support felony murder conviction when multiple people had
access to the child).
"' See AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 404-07.
143 668 S.W.2d 17 (Ark. 1984).
"'Id. at 18-19.
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mother had a legal duty to protect her child from abuse and
that, by failing to protect, the mother caused the death "under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life." 14 The numerous social and policy issues raised by
prosecution in such circumstances are beyond the scope of this
article.14 To the extent that it raises a pertinent issue in the
prosecution of child homicide, it is appropriately addressed by
legislation expressing a state's policy.
147
4. Corpus Delicti
The doctrine of corpus delicti is intended to "reduc[e] the
possibility of punishing a person for a crime which was never in
fact committed " 14l by requiring proof of a criminal act and
criminal agency. That is, there must be evidence that "one per-
son was killed, and another person killed him."14  The corpus
delicti doctrine commonly appears in cases in which the cause
of a child's death cannot be definitively proven by medical evi-
dence. The argument is made that, absent conclusive proof of
the cause of death or absent categorical exclusion of all other
possible causes of death, the criminal act is not proven. Most
courts reject these arguments. Thus, if a child dies of severe
head trauma, the doctrine of corpus delicti requires only suffi-
' Id. at 19-20. See also State v. Miranda, 715 A.2d 680, 685 (Conn. 1998) (boyfriend
who established a "family-like" relationship with mother and two children convicted
of first degree assault for failing to protect the children from the mother's abuse);
Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1997) (mother has a legal duty to pro-
tect child from physical injury); Labastida v. State, 931 P.2d 1334, 1339 (Nev.
1996) (mother convicted of second degree murder for failing to protect seven-week-
old).
"46 For discussion of problems arising in prosecuting a parent for failing to protect
a child from another parent or caretaker, see V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered
Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 229 (1996); Heather R. Skinazi, Comment, Not Just a "Conjured After-
thought': Using Duress as a Defense for Battered Women Who "Fail to Protect", 85 CAT- L.
REv. 993 (1997); Nancy A. Tanck, Note, Commendable or Condemnable? Criminal Liability
for Parents Who Fail to Protect Their Children from Abuse, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 659 (1987).
,17 See S.C. CODEANN. § 16-385(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
'" 1 LAFAVE & ScTr, supra note 67, § 1.4(b), at 24.
State v. Morton, 638 P.2d 928, 932 (Kan. 1982) (quoting State v. Doyle, 441 P.2d
846 (Kan. 1968)). See also United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir.
1973) (evidence that defendant killed seven previous children sufficient to prove the
corpus delicti in prosecution for the murder of an eight-month-old foster child).
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cient evidence which tends to prove a criminal act, but need not
affirmatively show that no possible accident could have caused
the injuries.'5°
Corpus delicti arguments also are made in two other cir-
cumstances, each of which arises occasionally in the prosecution
of child homicide. First are cases in which a newborn is killed
by a caretaker and the body of the child is not recovered. Al-
though the common law precluded prosecution when no body
was found, the modern practice does not automatically preclude
prosecution on these grounds.' Another category of cases are
those in which a defendant confesses to a crime. The common
law rule precluded conviction based on a confession alone, re-
quiring some evidence independent of the confession to cor-
roborate the occurrence of a crime. Although federal courts
simply look to whether the circumstances of the confession in-
dicate trustworthiness, some state courts retain the common
"0 See State v. Morton, 638 P.2d 928, 932 (Kan. 1982) (rejecting the argument that
the state "must completely disprove the possibility of death by natural or accidental
causes"); State v. Perdue, 357 S.E.2d 345 (N.C. 1987) (rejecting the argument that a
conviction must be reversed because the state failed to expressly preclude accident as
the cause of death); State v.James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991) (inability to prove cause
of death through autopsy does not preclude finding of criminal act). But see State v.
May, 689 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (manslaughter conviction reversed be-
cause prosecution witnesses did not categorically exclude a fall as a cause of death of
an 11-month-old, nor did the prosecution adequately prove the defendant was the
criminal agent); State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291 (Utah 1992) (evidence of multiple inju-
ries to child sufficient to corroborate confession even though the child likely died
from suffocation for which there was no conclusive medical evidence). Cf. State v.
Cunningham, 598 P.2d 756, 773-74 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (evidence that child was
subjected to physical abuse over a period of time corroborates confession even if nu-
merous persons could have inflicted the injuries), rev'd on other grounds, 613 P.2d 1139
(Wash. 1980).
1 SeeJones v. State, 701 N.E.2d 863 (Ind. 1998) (production of body not required
when circumstantial evidence shows a death occurred; evidence sufficient to corrobo-
rate confession in murder of four-year-old); State v. Nicely, 529 N.E.2d 1236 (Ohio
1988) (circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to support murder conviction
even in the absence of a body, a confession, or other direct evidence of death). See
also 1 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 67, § 1.4(b), at 2 n.19 (Supp. 1998); Rollin M.
Perkins, The Corpus Delicti of Murder, 48 VA. L REv. 173, 189 (1962) (discussing neona-
ticide no body cases).
" See Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954).
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law view and require independent corroboration of the confes-
sion.153
Finally, most courts hold that a conviction will not be sus-
tained based on evidence of mere presence at the scene of a
crime or mere opportunity to commit the crime. Thus, evi-
dence that a parent was home during the time at which a child
was killed is not, without more, sufficient to prove the person
killed the child.
However, "more than a mere opportunity" exists when a
person has sole or exclusive custody. For example, in Woodrum
v. State,154 the two-year-old victim was picked up from a child care
center by her mother's boyfriend. Substantial evidence indi-
cated that the child was healthy while at child care and she ap-
peared terrified when the defendant picked her up."5
Defendant had exclusive custody of the child until approxi-
mately one and one-half hours later when he picked up the
child's mother and they went directly to the hospital. The de-
fendant gave a false history to the doctors, causing a forty-five
minute delay before the doctors were able to care for the actual
injuries. The child died from internal injuries caused by blunt
force trauma to her abdomen. At trial, conflicting medical tes-
timony indicated that the child's injuries could have occurred
while she was in defendant's custody or sometime earlier. The
court held that the circumstantial evidence as a whole demon-
strated defendant had "more than a mere opportunity."15 6 In
cases such as this, the court held, "exclusive opportunity" may
be "almost conclusive evidence of guilt."'57
'3 See People v. McMahan, 548 N.W.2d 199 (Mich. 1996) (reaffirming the common
law corpus delicti requirement that a confession be corroborated by independent
evidence); State v. Aten, 927 P.2d 210, 224 (Wash. 1996) (defendant admitted placing
her hand over child's mouth but inconclusive medical evidence failed to corroborate
confession).
" 498 N.E.2d 1318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
"sId. at 1323-24.
'"Id. at 1324.
'Id Cf. State v. May, 689 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting prosecu-




5. Proof of Intent Based on Circumstantial Evidence
Rarely does direct evidence of a person's intent exist in a
criminal prosecution. Rather, a defendant's state of mind must
be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Proof of intent by
circumstantial evidence in child homicide cases is likewise nec-
essary since these crimes are nearly always committed when the
defendant is alone with the child; only on rare occasions will a
defendant give a full confession to the police or make direct
statements of his or her intent. As stated by an Illinois appellate
court: "Not only can circumstantial evidence be used to prove
knowledge, but absent evidence of an admission by a defendant,
it is the only way to prove knowledge."'5 8 Courts look to several
specific factors in analyzing a defendant's intent in child homi-
cide prosecutions.
The serious nature of the injuries. Many courts recognize the
serious nature of a child's injuries is, by itself, evidence that the
person who caused the injuries knew or should have known he
was inflicting great bodily harm. Particularly in cases of a vio-
lent shaking or a beating, medical testimony as to the violent
nature of the act tends to prove the defendant's state of mind.15 9
As stated by a Missouri appellate court in a shaken baby case,
"The serious nature of [the victim's] brain injury is, in and of it-
self, a basis for inferring that [defendant] knew that his actions
would be practically certain to result in [the victim's] death."16
Admissions. Prompt questioning of a suspect at times pro-
duces partial or complete admissions of the conduct alleged.
For example, judicial opinions discussirIg cases in which an in-
fant was shaken report a variety of admissions, including admis-
sions to throwing or squeezing a child, shaking a child "mildly"
in anger, and shaking to revive a child.16 A partial admission of
People v. Rader, 651 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added).
See People v. Ripley, 685 N.E.2d 362, 365-66 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997) (finding the vio-
lent nature of shaking, in combination with other facts, to support a finding that de-
fendant "must have known about the substantial probability of causing injury to the
victim" in aggravated battery prosecution).
" State v. Broseman, 947 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). See also 1 MYERS,
supra note 67, § 4.36, at 380 n.472.
161 See, e.g., Allen v. State, 546 So. 2d 1009, 1011 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (defendant
admitted that at times he would throw the nine-month-old victim in the air and fail to
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shaking or otherwise injuring a child helps establish the act oc-
curred, and subsequent medical testimony demonstrates the
degree to which the defendant's explanation is consistent with
the degree of injury inflicted upon the child.62
Failure to seek medical care. A defendant's failure to promptly
seek medical attention for the child or failure to give medical
professionals a full and accurate history provides evidence of the
defendant's mental state. For example, if a defendant gives a
fictitious history to emergency medical personnel and then later
admits that he did, in fact, shake or strike the child, the prose-
cutor may use the initial deceit to show the defendant's con-
sciousness of guilt or to show the defendant's willingness to
further endanger the child's welfare by withholding information
vital to the child's treatment.16s
Prior injuries. Evidence of prior injuries may be admissible
not only to prove that an incident was not an accident, but also
to affirmatively prove the defendant had the requisite mental
state for the crime charged.I64 For example, in State v. Candela 65
a four and one-half-year-old child was severely beaten, and the
child died from head injuries inflicted by her father's girlfriend.
At trial, the state introduced evidence of bruises that existed be-
fore the fatal beating. The Missouri Court of Appeals found
that a "multitude" of prior cases had upheld the admission of
catch him); People v. Oaks, 662 N.E.2d 1328, 1334-35 (Ill. 1996) (videotaped state-
ment of defendant admitting to throwing the child in anger); People v. Ripley, 685
N.E.2d 362, 364 (I1. App. Ct. 1997) (defendant admitted shaking the child to "get
him to settle down"); People v. Biggs, 509 N.W.2d 803, 804 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993) (defendant admitted smothering child with a pillow); State v. Broseman, 947
S.W.2d 520, 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (defendant admitted violently shaking his son).
SSee United States v. Curry, 31 M.J. 359, 372 (C.M. 1990).
TM See I MYES, supra note 67, § 4.36, at 381-82.
'"Discussions of prior evidence of physical abuse often arise in the context of the
widely recognized medical diagnosis of battered child syndrome, which is the "unex-
plained or inappropriately explained physical trauma and other manifestations of se-
vere, repeated physical abuse of children, usually by a parent." DORLAND's
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1625 (28th ed. 1994) (cited in 1 MYERS, supra note
67, § 4.6, at 305 n. 63). When an abused child suffers from the condition, expert tes-
timony on battered child syndrome is admissible in nearly every jurisdiction. 1
MYERS, supra note 67, § 4.6, at 306. Evidence also is admissible as prior act evidence
to show a child's injuries were not accidental. Id. § 4.6, at 307. For extensive discus-
sion of these issues, see id. at § 4.6.
'm 929 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
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prior misconduct evidence as evidence of "motive, intent, or ab-
sence of mistake or accident," and concluded: "The evidence of
abuse adduced at trial in this case was admissible to show an in-
tent on defendant's part to cause serious physical injury to [the
victim], and to refute defendant's claim that [the victim's] inju-
ries were accidental."16
First degree murder cases. A relatively formalized list of factors
has been examined by numerous courts to assist in determining
premeditation in first degree murder prosecutions: "(1) the
brutality of the attack, and whether more than one blow was
struck; (2) the disparity in size and strength between the defen-
dant and the victim; (3) the concealment of the victim's body;
(4) the defendant's lack of remorse and efforts to avoid detec-
tion; and (5) motive."1 7 While excessive focus on the nature of
the attack itself is disapproved by commentators, these factors
are nonetheless followed in many jurisdictions to assess a de-
fendant's premeditation'o
IV. SPECIAL CHILD HOMCIDE STATUTES
A. TYPES OF STATUTES
Not every statute that increases punishment for the death of
a child is a child homicide statute. For purposes of this article, a
statute must meet three criteria. First, the statute must be a
homicide statute. Statutes increasing penalties for felony bat-
tery or child abuse when the victim dies are excluded because
they are not homicide statutes. For example, a felony child
abuse statute in Colorado increases punishment based on a
combination of the actor's intent and the degree of injury in-
'66 Id. at 871.
67 Archie v. Commonwealth, 420 S.E.2d 718, 721 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Ep-
perly v. Commonwealth, 294 S.E.2d 882, 892-93 (Va. 1982)).
'6 See 2 LAFAVE & SCoTr, supra note 67, § 7.7(a), at 240.
69 Because Oregon and Louisiana have created a more comprehensive approach
toward the punishment of child homicide, I have included all relevant child-related
homicide offenses in the appendix regardless of whether each component qualifies as
a child homicide statute. See infra notes 216-25 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of these states.
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flicted upon a child. 70 While these laws may have beneficial ef-
fect, they do not result in a homicide conviction for a person
who kills a child.
Second, a child homicide statute penalizes the killing of a
child by a person committing an act of physical abuse or battery
upon a child. Laws enhancing the offense or penalty when a
person kills a child while in the course of committing a sexual
offense against the child, kidnapping a child, or other offenses
against a child are not included.17 1 These offenses are essentially
aggravated murder offenses, directed at everything except the
physical abuse of a child. Similarly excluded are statutes ad-
dressing the death of a child resulting from an act of omission
such as neglect, failure to protect, and failure to supervise. Most
child homicide statutes do not address acts of omission, and the
scope and complexity of issues raised by imposing criminal cul-
pability for acts of omission precludes thorough treatment in
this article.'7
170 See COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-6401(7) (a) & (b) (1998). See also MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 35C (1996 & Supp. 1998).
'7' See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1 (West 1998) (child molesting and criminal
deviant conduct listed as underlying felonies to felony murder); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.030 (1997) (sexual assault, sexual abuse of a child and sexual molestation of a
child under the age of 14 years listed as underlying felonies to felony murder).
'72 Child deaths caused by a caretaker's failure to adequately supervise a child or
adequately care for a child's physical needs raise extremely difficult issues of criminal
culpability. The difficulties lie in the manner in which to codify an offense that dis-
tinguishes cases deserving criminal punishment. Deaths of children range from the
clear culpability of a parent with adequate means who fails to feed a child to cases
where a young child falls into a swimming pool or dies from a fire when left unat-
tended. Occasional reports of parents whose children die locked in a car on a sum-
mer day highlight the difficulties of imposing criminal liability. See, e.g., Nicole
Marshall, Toddler Dies of Heat Stroke, TULSA TRIBUNE & TULSA WORLD, Oct. 2, 1997, at
Al (describing father who forgot child in back seat of his car;, although arrested on a
manslaughter charge, a law enforcement official was quoted as saying- "We certainly
don't intend to try to lock this gentleman up for a long time, because I'm sure he's
going through his own phase of punishment at this time."); The Associated Press,
Baby Dies After Father Forgets He Left Her in the Car, LA. TIMES,June 27,1997, at A3 (de-
scribing death of child in California who was left in the back seat of a car after the fa-
ther forgot to drop the child at child care on his way to work); Mike Rodman, Charge
Debated in Heat Deaths, DAuAs MORNING NEWS, May 3, 1998, at 49A (describing death
of two children intentionally locked in a car by the father of one of the children and a
friend of the father while the two adults lingered nearby for eight hours).
For an example of a child homicide statute addressing criminal neglect, see the
Oregon child homicide statutes that include as a separate offense causing the death
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Third, a child homicide statute does not require proof that
the actor intended to kill or should have known an act would
kill a child. Thus, statutes establishing the age of a child as an
aggravating factor to a murder charge are not included when
the element of a "knowing or purposeful" killing remains.173
Likewise, statutes addressing particular acts (such as murder by
torture or starvation) that require proof of an intent to commit
the particular act are not included.174 While deserving their own
policy debates, the issues raised by these statutes are separate
from the primary concern in this article of the difficulty of prov-
ing intent in cases of children who are killed from assaultive
acts.
Statutes meeting the above definition fall into two broad
categories. First are felony murder statutes which list as an un-
derlying felony a child abuse offense.175 The elements of the
of a child by neglect or maltreatment. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.115(1)(c),
163.118(1) (c), 163.125(1)(c) (Supp. 1998).
173 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(15) (1994) (capital offense if child under 14 is
murdered); ARm CODE ANN. § 5-10-102 (1997)(first degree murder to knowingly
cause the death of a child under 14); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-102(f) (1997) (first
degree murder if a person in a position of trust with respect to the victim knowingly
causes the death of the child under 12); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54b (West
Supp. 1998)(capital offense if child under 16 murdered); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-
3(b) (3) (a) (West Supp. 1998) (increased penalty if murder victim is under 14); TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a) (8) (West 1994) (capital murder if child under six mur-
dered).
The Arkansas and Colorado statutes could be classified as child homicide statutes
in that they eliminate any requirement of premeditation and deliberation for first de-
gree murder. However, I do not include these as child homicide statutes since they
retain a requirement of proof that the defendant knowingly caused the death of a
child.
"a See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/9-1(b) (7) (West 1997) (capital offense if a child
is under 12 and death results from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indica-
tive of wanton cruelty).
'- See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A) (2) (West Supp. 1997) (underlying felony:
child abuse); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1) (a) (2) (h) (West Supp. 1999) (underlying
felony: aggravated child abuse); IDAHO CODE § 18.4003(d) (1997) (underlying felony:
aggravated battery on a child under 12); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401(b)
(1995) (underlying felony- abuse of a child); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(A) (2) (b)
(West Supp. 1999) (underlying felony: cruelty to juveniles); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-
19(2)(f) (Supp. 1998) (underlying felonies: felonious child abuse or battery of a
child); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(1) (c) (1997) (underlying felony: abuse or ne-
glect of a child); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.115(1) (b) () (Supp. 1998) (underlying
felony: first or second degree assault of a child under 14); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
202(a) (2) (Supp. 1998) (underlying felonies: aggravated child abuse or aggravated
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statutes are simple: the killing of a child in the course of com-
mitting felony child abuse upon the child. Variations among
these statutes are minimal and largely inconsequential. A few
states expressly indicate that only the mental state accompany-
ing the underlying felony need be proven, 76 and other legisla-
tures have inserted language to address issues arising under the
case law of that state.'7 On the whole, however, a felony murder
statute simply adds a state's felony child abuse offense to the list
of felonies underlying an existing felony murder statute.
Utah employs the felony murder concept to develop several
different child homicide offenses, with the degree of seriousness
of the homicide offense dependent on the level of culpability at-
tached to the underlying offense. The underlying statute di-
vides child abuse into two separate offenses: infliction of
physical injury upon a child and infliction of serious physical in-
jury upon a child. 78 The penalty attached to the murder de-
child neglect); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1998) (underlying felonies: child
abuse).
I do not include states identifying any felony as one which underlies felony mur-
der, although the practical effect may be the same if prosecutors make use of the
statute. SeeMo. REv. STAT. § 565.021 (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (Michie 1997);
S.D. CoDIm LAWS § 22-16-9 (Michie 1997). Nor do I attempt to identify those states
in which a felonious battery serves as an underlying felony. As discussed throughout
this article, the recurrent problem with prosecuting child homicide has been that
common law doctrines have not been employed to obtain convictions proportionate
to the crime. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. Exceptions to the rule, of
course, exist.
'76 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(A) (2) (b) (West Supp. 1999).
'77 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3436 (1995) (including language to address case
law applying the merger doctrine to prior felony murder child abuse cases).
'7 As defined in the statute, physical injury means:
[Ain injury to or condition of a child which impairs the physical condition of the child,
including- (i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; (ii) a minor laceration or abra-
sion; (iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or (iv) any other condition which imperils
the child's health or welfare and which is not a serious physical injury as defined in Sub-
section (d).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(1) (c) (Supp. 1998). Serious physical injury is
defined as:
[A]ny physical injury or set of injuries which seriously impairs the child's health,
or which involves physical torture or causes serious emotional harm to the child, or
which involves a substantial risk of death to the child, including: (i) fracture of any bone
or bones; (ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of the brain, whether caused
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pends on whether the underlying child abuse was committed in-
tentionally or knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence.
Thus, the most serious offense is the intentional or knowing in-
fliction of serious physical injury upon a child which results in
thechild's death.! The next most serious offenses are the reck-
less or criminally negligent infliction of serious physical injury
which results in death.' 80 The least serious offense is the inten-
tional, knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent infliction of
physical injury upon a child which leads to the child's death.8
Using the felony murder model as a base, the Utah statutes
connect the culpability in the commission of the underlying of-
fense to the punishment resulting from the homicide offense.
In contrast to felony murder statutes which merely expand
an existing definition of murder, a homicide by abuse statute is
typically a completely separate offense, unrelated to other
homicide offenses. A common construction of a child homicide
statute is exemplified by the South Carolina statute: "A person is
guilty of homicide by child abuse who.., causes the death of a
child under the age of eleven while committing child abuse or
neglect and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to human life."
by blows, shaking, or causing the child's head to impact with an object or surface; (iii)
any burn, including burns inflicted by hot water, or those caused by placing a hot object
upon the skin or body of the child; (iv) any injury caused by use of a dangerous weapon
as defined in Section 76-1-601; (v) any combination of two or more physical injuries in-
flicted by the same person, either at the same time or on different occasions; (vi) any
damage to internal organs of the body;, (vii) any conduct toward a child which results in
severe emotional harm, severe developmental delay or retardation, or severe impair-
ment of the child's ability to function; (viii) any injury which creates a permanent dis-
figurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, limb,
or organ; (ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease breathing, even if resuscitation
is successful following the conduct; or (x) any conduct which results in starvation or
failure to thrive or malnutrition thatjeopardizes the child's life.
Id. § 76-5-109(1) (d) (Supp. 1998). The child abuse offense also applies to
one who, "having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits an-
other to inflict physical injury upon a child." Id. § 76-5-109(2) (a) (Supp.
1998).
1 Id. § 76-5-203(1) (d) (Supp. 1998). Utah also has a capital murder offense ap-
plicable when a person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of a child while
committing child abuse on a child under 14. Id- § 76-5-202(1) (d) (Supp. 1998).
'o I& § 76-5-208(1) (a) & (b) (Supp. 1998).
.. Id- § 76-5-208(1) (c) (Supp. 1998)."
182 S.C. CODEANN. § 16-3-85(A) (1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
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Homicide by abuse statutes contain three basic elements:
(1) the actor kills a child while engaged in child abuse; (2) the
circumstances manifest an extreme indifference to the value of
human life; and (3) the victim is a child under a specified age.
First, homicide by abuse statutes specify that the killing must
be related to child abuse. In some states this is embodied by the
requirement that the act be committed while in the course of
committing child abuse or a battery upon a child.' 3  Other
states require proof of prior incidents of abuse upon the child.'8
The element may be broadly defined as engaging "in a past pat-
tern of child abuse upon the child"'5 or precisely defined as one
or more incidents of child abuse.'8 It may apply only to the
child who was killed 187 or may apply if the person has engaged in
a pattern of abuse of other children'ss A few states impose the
additional requirement that the actor be a parent, guardian, or
a person in a position of trust in relation to the victim.'
The second element, exemplified by the South Carolina
statute, is an altered mental state, most commonly that the act
"manifest extreme indifference to human life." In some states
the mental state is that a person act recklessly or with criminal
negligence,' 9' while other states require the act be committed
"knowingly."9' Some states combine two or more mental states,
1- See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273ab (Supp. 1999); IowA CODE § 707.2(5) (Supp.
1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7(C) (West Supp. 1999); S.C. CODEANN. § 16-3-
85(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998); W.VA. CODE § 61-8D-2a (1997).
" See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.100(a)(2) (1998); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-
102(1)(f) (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 633 & 634 (1995 & Supp. 1998); MINN,
STAT. § 609.185(5) (1996); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.115(1)(c), 163.118(1)(c),
163.125(1) (c) (Supp. 1998); WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 9A.32.055 (West 1988).
,'MINN. STAT. § 609.185(5) (Supp. 1999).
'Q- REv. STAT. ANN. § 163.115(6) (c) (Supp. 1998).
"'MNN. STAT. § 609.185(5) (Supp. 1999).
"'OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 163.115(1) (c) (Supp. 1998).
' Se4 e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273ab (West Supp. 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-
102(1) (f) (1997); W. VA. CODE § 61-8D2a (1997).
1- See e.g., OR. REv. STAY. ANN. §§ 163.118(1)(c) & 163.125(1)(c) (Supp. 1998);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 633 & 634 (1995 & Supp. 1998). States imposing a "reck-
less" standard typically also require proof of a past pattern of abuse. See id.
.. Depending on the wording of statutes and how courts interpret the "knowing"
requirement, this element may negate the intended effect of a child homicide statute
by requiring proof that the person knew or should have known that the conduct
would result in the death of the child. For this reason, such statutes are excluded in
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requiring, for example, proof of a "reckless" act committed
"under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to
human life."
192
Last, an element present in both felony murder and homi-
cide by abuse statutes is the age group of children to which the
statute applies. Of the twenty-one child homicide statutes in-
cluded in the appendix, the states apply their statutes as indi-
cated by Table 2.193
While the vast majority of child homicides are committed
against very young children, most child homicide statutes ex-
pansively apply to children up to age seventeen. In many states,
this construction mirrors the child physical abuse statute and
provides a logical and consistent delineation.'9
this article from the classification as child homicide statutes. See, e.g., Davis v. State,
925 S.W.2d 768, 773 (Ark. 1996) (defining "knowingly" under ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-
102(a) (3) as a person who "is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will
cause such a result").
By comparison, ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.100(a) (2) (1998) has a "knowing" require-
ment, but "knowing" refers to the underlying assault, not the killing itself. Thus, a
person must knowingly engage in a pattern or practice of assault or torture, but need
not know the act is likely to kill a child.
'9 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 124.25(4) (McKinney 1998); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §
163.115(1)(c) (Supp. 1998).
'93 Under 18: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A) (2) (West Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 782.04 (West Supp. 1999); IowA CODE § 707.2(5) (Supp. 1998); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3436(a)(7) (1995); MINN. STAT. § 609.185(5) (Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-19(2) () (Supp. 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(1) (c) (1997); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7(C) (West Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a) (2)
(Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE § 61-8D-2a(a) (1997). Under 17: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:30.1(A) (2) (b) (West Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-208 (Supp. 1998). Un-
der 16: ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.100(a) (2) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.055
(West 1988). Under 14: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 633 & 634 (1995 & Supp. 1998);
OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.115(1)(b)(J), 163.115(1)(c), 163.118(1)(c),
163.125(1)(c) (Supp. 1998). Under 12: IDAHO CODE § 18-4003(d) (1997); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504(b) (West 1998). Under 11: N.Y. PENAL LAW §125.25(4)
(McKinney 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998). Under 8:
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273ab (West Supp. 1999).
Louisiana has three different ages, depending on the offense. The offense listed
above is a felony murder statute that most closely resembles the other child homicide
statutes listed here.
' Although few cases of beating deaths involve children older than 12, such abu-
sive incidents do occur within families, and thus an older age is justified on these
grounds. See, e.g. Peter Pae, Va. Woman Sentenced to 12 Years in Daughter's Killing,
WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1996, at B1 (describing starvation, torture, beating and murder of
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TABLE 2.
AGE GROUP TO WHICH CHILD HOMICIDE STATUTES APPLY









The relevant language from current felony murder and
homicide by abuse statutes is provided in the appendix. The
appendix makes it clear that few statutes are identical, although
most fit broadly into one of the two categories identified above.
B. APPELLATE REVIEW OF SPECIAL CHILD HOMICIDE STATUTES
Homicide by abuse statutes have not resulted in a substan-
tial body of case law, with state-specific issues of statutory inter-
pretation such as jury instructions on lesser included offenses
comprising the majority of issues.95 In contrast to convictions
12-year-old by the girl's mother and the mother's boyfriend). See also supra notes 22-
26 and accompanying text.
'" See, e.g., State v. Smith, 935 P.2d 841 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a crime
of omission-failure to seek medical care-can be the underlying felony, especially
since the felony was specifically enumerated in the child homicide statute); People v.
Preller, 54 Cal. App. 4th 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (analyzing syntax of CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 273ab); Green v. State, 680 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that de-
fendant may be convicted of both felony murder and aggravated child abuse); State v.
Altum, 941 P.2d 1348 (Kan. 1997) (instruction for second-degree murder and invol-
untary manslaughter not required in prosecution for first degree felony murder when
facts indicated defendant killed 14-month-old child either by shaking or by violent
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under murder or manslaughter statutes, challenges to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence are rare, and numerous convictions have
been upheld.196 Those issues that have arisen have been uni-
formly weak and disposed of by courts with minimal discussion.
For example, in State v. Thompson,197 the defendant attacked the
Iowa child homicide statute on the grounds that the trial court's
explanation to the jury of the meaning of "manifesting extreme
indifference to human life" was inadequate. The Iowa Supreme
Court disagreed, finding instead that a judge "has no duty to
explain non-technical terms or phrases that are readily compre-
hended. " "' This case is representative of the trend-most child
blows to the head); Kolberg v. State, 704 So. 2d 1307, 1315 (Miss. 1997) (defendant
entitled to instruction on felony manslaughter (Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(2) (f)
(Supp. 1998)) because at the time of conviction the elements of felony manslaughter
were "indistinguishable" from capital murder in the course of committing child
abuse); Grady v. State, 947 P.2d 1069 (Okla. Grim. App. 1997) (discussing whether the
jury was properly instructed as to the elements of first degree murder in the commis-
sion of child abuse); Revilla v. State, 877 P.2d 1143, 1149 (Okla. Grim. App.
1994) (second degree murder and second degree manslaughter instructions not re-
quired when evidence showed that acts were committed with the "design to effect
death"). Cf. Bannister v. State, 930 P.2d 1176 (Okla. Grim. App. 1996) (reversing con-
viction based on improper jury instructions; finding "willful" in the child homicide
statute to mean an intent to injure).
" Se, e.g., Kolberg v. State, 704 So. 2d 1307 (Miss. 1997) (finding sufficient evi-
dence to convict under child homicide statute, but reversing on other grounds); Wis-
dom v. State, 918 P.2d 384 (Okla. Grim. App. 1996) (death penalty for first degree
homicide by abuse is not cruel and unusual); Drew v. State, 771 P.2d 224 (Okla. Grim.
App. 1989) (child homicide statute constitutional); Schultz v. State, 749 P.2d 559
(Okla. Grim. App. 1988) (holding merger doctrine inapplicable to child homicide
statute); State v. Butterfield, 874 P.2d 1339 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to hold
murder by abuse statute facially void for vagueness); State v. Pollard, 888 P.2d 1054
(Or. Ct. App. 1994) (homicide by abuse statute not overbroad); State v. Russell, 848
P.2d 743 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (homicide by abuse statute not unconstitutionally
vague).
19 570 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1997). The Iowa statute is unique in that it is a first de-
gree murder statute and still requires proof of "malice aforethought." It differs from
the aggravated murder statutes discussed supra, note 171, in that malice aforethought
is defined as "a state of mind which leads to an intentionally wrongful act done out of
hatred or with an evil or unlawful purpose." 570 N.W.2d at 769. First degree child
abuse murder requires the additional elements of a child victim, the killing occurring
during an assault, and circumstances that manifest extreme indifference to human
life. Id.19 s Id. at 768 (quoting State v. Dominguez, 512 A.2d 1112, 1113 (N.H. 1986)).
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homicide statutes have not been successfully attacked on any ba-
sis that would undermine their fundamental validity.19
The one exception to this rule is found in Tennessee, where
several versions of a child homicide statute have been the target
of successful attacks. In 1988, the Tennessee legislature
amended its first degree murder statute to include as a capital
offense the killing of a child under the age of thirteen "if the
child's death results from one or more incidents of a protracted
pattern or multiple incidents of child abuse committed by the
defendant against such child, or if such death results from the
cumulative effects of such pattern or incidents."" In State v.
Hale,2°1 the court held that Tennessee's equivalent of due proc-
ess under the state constitution prohibited the imposition of the
death penalty under such circumstances.
In Hale, the defendant had engaged in numerous episodes
of beating the child, some of which resulted in bruising and
some of which, by the defendant's admission, would have re-
sulted in death had the child's mother not intervened.202 The
defendant ultimately killed the two-year-old child by inflicting
blows that caused deep tears to the child's liver and bowels.2
5
Because first degree murder was a capital offense, the court re-
lied on previous death penalty cases that prohibited imposition
of the death penalty through introduction of prior acts of a de-
fendant as aggravating factors in the sentencing phase of a capi-
tal case. The court held that the child homicide statute similarly
allowed a capital conviction on the basis of misdemeanor child
' See supra note 196. One potential argument that has not resulted in published
appellate decisions is that because a child homicide statute is narrower than murder
and manslaughter offenses, it supersedes those offenses and precludes charging un-
der traditional murder or manslaughter statutes. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 348 P.2d
214, 215 (Wash. 1960) (holding a vehicular homicide statute supersedes manslaughter
statute on the grounds that "where a general and subsequent special statute relates to
the same subject, the provisions of the latter must prevail."). To avoid this argument,
it is advisable for the statute to articulate whether the legislature intends a child
homicide statute to supersede other statutes. See, e.g., DEL CoDE ANN. tit. 11, §§
633(c), 634(c) (Supp. 1998) ("Prosecution under this section does not preclude
prosecution under any other section of the Code").
2TENN. CoDEANN. § 39-2-202(a) (2) (Supp. 1988).
"' 840 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. 1992).




abuse offenses for which the defendant had not been convicted.
The court found that Tennessee's equivalent of due process
under the state constitution prohibited the imposition of the
death penalty under such circumstances. m
Subsequently, the Tennessee legislature amended the child
homicide statute, defining the offense as a "reckless" killing of a
child under thirteen when the death results from aggravated
child abuse, and an unpublished 1998 opinion upheld the valid-
ity of this definition .2  The "reckless" element was removed in
1995, transforming it into a straightforward felony murder stat-
ute with aggravated child abuse as the underlying felony.2 The
statute expressly states that "[n]o culpable mental state is re-
quired for conviction... except the intent to commit the enu-
merated offenses or acts."20 7 Presumably this version of the
statute would be even less objectionable than the one at issue in
Roberson and would likewise be upheld.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. ARE SPECIAL CHILD HOMICIDE STATUTES NECESSARY?
1. Arguments Against Special Child Homicide Statutes
A number of legitimate arguments can be formulated in
opposition to child homicide statutes. One argument is that the
elements of murder are by design more difficult to prove be-
cause murder is one of the most serious offenses for which a
person can be prosecuted. From this perspective, child homi-
cide is no different from any other homicide: the burden is on
the prosecutor to demonstrate that the fatal act is committed
with an intent to kill or knowledge that death would result. De-
cisions of such importance that are fact-driven should not be
legislated, but should be based upon a fact-finder's evaluation of
all the evidence offered to prove intent in an individual case.
2 Id at 308.
' State v. Roberson, No. 02C01-9702-CC-0083, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 107
(Tenn. Crim. App.Jan. 23, 1998).
2' TENN. CoDEANN. § 39-13-202(b) (Supp. 1998).
SId.
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A second argument against child homicide statutes is that
special statutes for child victims of abuse make children less
than full persons. These statutes could label children as unde-
serving of the full protection of the law afforded adults. Rather
than enacting special statutes, the argument goes, energy
should be devoted to educating the public as to the existence of
child homicide and training prosecutors to respond to the con-
duct with serious criminal charges.
A third argument against child homicide statutes is that they
cannot affect several of the other major obstacles to prosecuting
child homicide. Child homicide statutes do nothing, for exam-
ple, to ease the prosecutor's burden to prove the corpus delicti
of the crime or to eliminate the existence of lesser included of-
fenses. When a baby is suffocated or shaken, the prosecutor
must still prove the death was caused by a criminal act and that
the defendant was the person responsible, and the jury may still
return a conviction of involuntary manslaughter. As seen previ-
ously,0 s proof of the mechanisms by which small children are
killed is difficult, and juries will find the process difficult even
with child homicide statutes.
2. Arguments in Favor of Special Child Homicide Statutes
Just as children receive special protection by the criminal
law in numerous other arenasY a strong argument supporting
child homicide statutes is that they simply extend these special
protections to children who are victims of homicide. All states
have some form of criminal battery offense, but all states also
have child physical abuse offenses that apply only to child vic-
tims.2 °  The circumstances surrounding child homicide-
whether a single act of anger that kills a child or a pattern of
abuse that leads to death-are unlike adult homicides.
Recognition of the unique harm to children and the unique
manner by which harm is inflicted upon children has made
See supra notes 30-65 and accompanying text.
See generally, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CHam ABUSE AND
NEGLECr STATE STATUTE SERIES (1998) (collecting various statutes affecting prosecu-
tion of child abuse).
20 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 5 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATE
STATUTES SERIES: PHYSICALABUSE (1998).
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harm is inflicted upon children has made physical abuse statutes
uniformly accepted, and extension of these protections to chil-
dren who are killed is consistent with this practice.
The history of treatment of child victims by the justice sys-
tem further supports child homicide statutes. Unfortunately,
many compelling arguments for child homicide statutes are
framed in the context of individual cases in which the public
perceives injustices to a child victim. An Arkansas statute was
precipitated by an opinion of the state Supreme Court reducing
a first degree murder conviction to second degree murder."'
New York, Oregon, and Tennessee enacted child homicide stat-
utes after convictions perceived as egregiously low for the con-
duct of the defendants. This pattern will no doubt continue.
The history of the treatment of child deaths, however, should
put states without such statutes on alert; legislators may have the
opportunity to better consider statutes when not in a position of
responding to a bad case. Nonetheless, both history and cur-
rent events combine to provide a strong case for the enactment
of child homicide statutes to prevent future injustices.
Finally, concerns for consistency support special statutes.
Case law reflects the wide disparity of sentences that can be im-
posed for similar acts. While child homicide statutes cannot
equalize sentencing among the states, they can allow for child
homicide cases within a state to be covered by the same statute
with the same sentencing ranges. Related to concerns for con-
sistency are concerns about racial, economic, and gender biases.
While it is premature to draw broad conclusions from single
cases, the Woodward case presents an uncomfortable question
for many: would the media attention and outcome of the case
have been different if the defendant were not a teenage, white,
British au pair?213 To the extent that child homicide statutes do
211 See Taylor, supra note 16 (giving history of the Arkansas statute).
21 See Bendetowies, supra note 1 (giving history of the New York statute); Stewart,
supra note 16 (giving history of the Oregon statute); Wade,.supra note 16 (giving his-
tory of the Tennessee statute).
2 See genera/!y RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THm LAW 256-384 (1997) (dis-
cussing effect of race and racial prejudice in criminal trials); Veronica D. Abney, The
Lessons of the Louise Woodward Case, APSAC ADVISOR, Winter 1997, at 4 (letter to the
editor) ("One could speculate that if Louise was a member of a poor and less valued
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not require a jury to look into the mind of a defendant, these
statutes may lessen the possibility of jurors and judges being in-
fluenced by preconceptions about the violent nature of certain
classes of individuals. Again, the focus is more on the act of kill-
ing a child and less on the mind of the defendant.1 4
The numerous cases identified throughout this article high-
light the difficulties judges and juries face in fitting the facts of
child homicide into traditional charging statutes. Rather than
focusing on the more subjective element of whether a person
intends death to result, child homicide statutes focus a trial on
the objective facts surrounding the act of killing a child by vio-
lent means.
In spite of the foregoing arguments, a categorical recom-
mendation that all states adopt special child homicide statutes is
notjustifiable. For example, in states in which child homicides
are adequately punished under existing law and in which courts
sustain such convictions, special statutes may be unnecessary.
Likewise, it is possible for a special statute to make prosecution
more difficult or to affect the ability of prosecutors to charge
more serious crimes for more serious offenses. As a result, each
state must consider the effectiveness of existing law and practice
before embracing a special statute.
ethnic group, the media might have been compelled to present her as unattractive,
frightening and malicious, and Judge Zobel might have never contemplated a sen-
tence of time served."); Jordana Hart, Typical Sentence is 15-20 Years, Review Reveals,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 1997, at A34 (comparing convictions and sentences for shak-
ing or beating babies to death in Massachusetts from 1989 to 1997); Derrick Z. Jack-
son, In Texas, A Child-Care Case with a Different Complexion, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19,
1997, at A23 (comparing the Louise Woodward conviction and sentence to a 12-year-
old African-American in Austin who received a 25 year sentence for the death of a
two-year-old child in her care). See also W LcZNSKi, supra note 20, at 115-46 (discuss-
ing different treatment of male and female perpetrators in England).
214 It should be emphasized that child homicide statutes in no way eliminate the
mens rea requirement. At a minimum, the felony murder model requires a knowing
or purposeful act underlying the homicide, and a homicide by abuse statute requires
proof of at least a reckless act committed with extreme indifference to human life.
The more comprehensive models, such as those found in Utah, Oregon, and Louisi-
ana, provide a range of possible offenses based on the various possible mental states
of a defendant. For a discussion of mental state in the context of other child abuse
crimes, see Charles A. Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the Criminal Law: In Search of
Reason, 22 SErON HmL LEGis.J. 1, 30-33 (1997).
1999
CHARLE A. PHIPPS
In many states, however, recurrent difficulties in obtaining
just convictions, or consistently hostile appellate courts will
make special child homicide statutes appropriate. Based in part
on these persistent problems and after spending more than two
years studying the issues and listening to testimony from profes-
sionals and, members of the public, the U.S. Advisory Board on
Child Abuse and Neglect determined enactment of child homi-
cide statutes to be a national priority.215  Children deserve and
need special protection, and child homicide statutes represent a
legitimate response to the societal ill posed by people who kill
children in their care. When properly evaluated and imple-
mented, child homicide statutes can provide a useful tool in
combating child abuse.
B. MODEL CHILD HOMICIDE STATUTES
1. The Comprehensive Oregon Model
A thorough statutory scheme exists in Oregon, which in
1997 enacted five separate homicide offenses against children.1
The most serious offense, aggravated murder,1 7 while not a
child homicide statute as defined in this article, provides the
most serious punishment for an intentional homicide of a child
under fourteen. Thus, the Oregon legislature considers the in-
tentional killing of a child under fourteen to be more serious
than an intentional killing of a person above that age.
A significant component of the Oregon child homicide
statutory scheme is a felony murder statute. A person who kills
a child under the age of fourteen in the course of committing
assault in the first or second degree commits murder.2 9 Assault
" U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 5, at 70.
216 S. 614, 69th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997). Louisiana also expanded its child
homicide provisions in 1997 to create a similarly comprehensive scheme. See 1997 La.
Acts 899 (adding cruelty to juveniles as underlying felony in second degree felony
murder statute). Because the Oregon statutes are slightly more thorough they are
evaluated here. However, legislators interested in the Oregon model should also
consider the Louisiana model.
217 OR. RE. STAT. ANN. § 163.095(1) (f) (Supp. 1998).
"
8 See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
2'9 OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 163.115(1) (b) (J) (Supp. 1998).
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in the first degree is the intentional infliction of serious physical
injury by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon;2" assault in
the second degree includes the intentional or knowing inflic-
tion of physical injury by means of a deadly or dangerous
weapon." An important aspect of this statute is the definition
of physical injury as "impairment of physical condition or sub-
stantial pain."2 Thus, a person who uses a deadly or dangerous
weapon to impair the physical condition or inflict substantial
pain on a child can be convicted of murder when a child dies as
a result of that conduct.
The next three offenses apply when a person has previously
engaged in a "pattern or practice of assault or torture of the vic-
tim." The accompanying mental state distinguishes murder
from manslaughter offenses under this "pattern or practice" of-
fense: proof of the act committed "recklessly under circum-
stances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life" constitutes murder,2 proof of recklessness alone consti-
tutes first degree manslaughter,24 and proof of criminal negli-
gence constitutes second degree manslaughter.2 These three
statutes allow a jury to consider degree of recklessness of a per-
son who engages in a pattern of abuse of a child and to convict
the person of the offense that reflects the behavior in an indi-
vidual case. In each case, however, the accompanying mental
state is lower than a "knowing" or "purposeful" killing that
would be required by a typical murder statute.
A comprehensive scheme such as this has several advantages
over a single child homicide statute. First is the clear public pol-
icy expression that the state considers child homicide to be a se-
rious evil. A legislature that contemplates the acts sufficiently to
incorporate them logically within their overall homicide statutes
2Id. § 163.185(1) (Supp. 1998).
22 Id. § 163.175(1) (b) (Supp. 1998). An issue that will no doubt be resolved in the
courts is whether human hands constitute a "deadly or dangerous weapon" when an
adult kills a child with bare hands by beating, shaking, or suffocation. Other states
may wish to define or eliminate this requirement.
Id § 163.015(7) (Supp. 1998).
I § 163.115(1) (c) (Supp. 1998).
" Id- § 163.118(1) (c) (Supp. 1998).
Id. § 163.125(1) (c) (Supp. 1998).
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demonstrates that enactment of the statutes is more than sym-
bolic.
A second advantage is the elevation of all comparable of-
fenses. Ajury in a state with a single child homicide statute may
still return a verdict of a lesser included offense such as man-
slaughter. When a jury convicts of a lesser offense in Oregon,
however, it is more likely to be one of the lesser child homicide
offenses with a more stringent penalty than would apply if the
victim were not a child.
A third advantage of the Oregon framework is that it recog-
nizes that not all homicides carry the same degree of culpability,
even when the victim is a child. A person who intentionally kills
a child after careful planning is punished more severely than
one who acts with extreme indifference to human life but with-
out a specific intent to kill. Further, the means by which chil-
dren are killed-such as violent shaking and hitting-do not
automatically evidence a single intent (such as intent to kill) for
all perpetrators. The mental state of the actor in each case is
factually dependent: the facts of one case may prove that a per-
son shook a child with a specific intent to kill; the facts of an-
other case may prove a person shook a child with no intent to
kill, but with extreme indifference to the value of the child's
life. The multiple degrees of culpability are reflected in the
Oregon statutes.
The most significant disadvantage of the Oregon scheme is
its complexity. It may not be practical for a state to amend every
homicide offense to address the problem of child homicide. In
such cases, one of the following statutes may be an acceptable
compromise.
2. Felony Murder and Homicide by Abuse Statutes
A felony murder statute, with the advantages of familiarity
and simplicity, may be the best option available in 
some states.2 26
A felony murder statute covers most instances of fatal child
abuse, easing the burden of proving that a person intended to
kill or should have known the act would result in the death of a
2 See supra, text accompanying notes 171-77.
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child. So long as the underlying felony does not impose a re-
quirement of proof of intent to cause permanent or serious
bodily injury, a felony murder statute accomplishes the objective
of a child homicide statute and offers a simple solution. Ex-
panding on a basic felony murder statute, the Utah approach
considers the mental state of the actor in committing the under-
lying felony, thus allowing a response that is more closely re-
lated to the facts of an individual case.2 While maintaining the
felony murder principle, the Utah approach increases available
punishment for actors who act with greater culpability.m
A homicide by abuse statute represents another alternative
when a comprehensive approach is not feasible. Such statutes
have several strengths. First, homicide by abuse statutes are
more narrowly drawn to the act of child homicide than are most
felony murder statutes. Requiring proof of "extreme indiffer-
ence to the value of human life," historically associated with the
crime of murder m more closely reflects a violent act of aggres-
sion by an adult against a child without going as far as to require
proof of "malice aforethought." Similarly, the acts of criminal
child abuse referenced-in homicide by abuse statutes provide
clear definitions of child abuse-related acts that are covered by
the statute. Again, the Oregon homicide by abuse statute pro-
vides a well-reasoned definition of the offense:
[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder by abuse when a person,
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life, causes the death of a child under 14 years of age...
and: (A) The person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of
assault or torture of the victim or another child under 14 years of
age . .. ; or (B) The person causes the death by neglect or maltreat-
menL
See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
m Cases which formerly resulted in convictions of negligent homicide, a misde-
meanor, now result in a third degree felony conviction. Telephone interview with
Rob Parrish, Utah Deputy Attorney General (July 10, 1998).
SSee supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 163.115(1) (c) (Supp. 1998).
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Significantly, a 1997 amendment re-defined "pattern or
practice" as one or more episodes, eliminating a previous re-
quirement that more than one assault be proven.21 Further,
"assault" is defined as "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
[causing] physical injury to another person," 32 removing poten-
tial arguments as to whether the underlying conduct separately
constituted "child abuse." Thus, murder is the killing of a child
by recklessly inflicting physical injury upon the child under cir-
cumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of
human life. This single Oregon statute covers the vast majority
of homicides of young children caused by child abuse and pro-
vides a workable model for states unable to adopt the entire
comprehensive Oregon scheme.
While other homicide by abuse statutes appear to have been
enacted with a comparable intent as the Oregon statute, many
are drafted with unnecessarily narrow language that limits their
usefulness. For example, statutes requiring proof of multiple
prior episodes of abuse preclude prosecution of the person who
violently shakes a child to death or who suffocates a child to
death under circumstances in which there is no evidence of
prior injuries.3 3 Although understandably drafted to target the
caretaker who abuses a child-perhaps with the battered child
in mind-these statutes preclude prosecution of the one-time
violent act that results in death. Moreover, statutes requiring
the actor to be a parent or caretaker,M while appropriately ad-
dressing the majority of offenders of this crime, may preclude
other equally culpable actors such as the boyfriend who takes
care of the child for a brief period of time.
When carefully drafted, homicide by abuse statutes repre-
sent a significant step in the protection of children. It is impor-
tant, however, to consider the effect of numerous limitations on
the applicability of these statutes.
&§ 163.115(6) (c) (Supp. 1998).
&Id. § 163.115(6) (a) (Supp. 1998).
" See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A child homicide statute should provide a strong statement
that society recognizes child homicide as a problem and is will-
ing to respond to the problem in a responsible manner. Con-
sequently, a state should enact a child homicide statute only
after thoughtful consideration as to the purpose, content, and
effect of such a statute. In this way, child homicide statutes can
provide a useful tool in the fight against child abuse.
As discussed in this article, the best approach is to consider
the range of fatal injuries inflicted upon children and draft
comprehensive statutes that adopt penalties appropriate to the
various offenses. When this is not feasible, a single carefully
drafted child homicide statute may sufficiently address the ma-
jority of child homicide facts.
Ultimately, the goal of all such statutes should be creating a
punishment that is proportionate to the conduct of killing a
child by other than accidental means. The value of a child's life
should be no less than the value of an adult's. Child homicide










Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerptm
ALASKASTAT. § 11.41.100(a) (2) (1998)
First degree murder
A person knowingly engages, under circum-
stances manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life, in a pattern or





A person commits the crime of murder in
the first degree if the person knowingly en-
gages, under circumstances manifesting ex-
treme indifference to the value of human
life, in a pattern or practice of assault or
torture of a child under the age of 16, and
one of the acts of assault or torture results
in the death of the child; for purposes of
this paragraph, a person "engages in a pat-
tern or practice of assault or torture" if the
person inflicts serious physical injury to the
child by at least two separate acts, and one
of the acts results in the death of the child.
ARIZONA
Code section ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (West
Supp. 1997)
Offense First degree murder
Mental state No specific mental state other than that re-
quired to prove the underlying felony
Is this a felony murder statute? Yes-underlying felony of child abuse
Although statutes from a few states are reprinted in their entirety in this ap-
pendix, most statutes have been substantially edited to retain only the language rele-
vant to child homicide. Readers who wish to further explore an individual state's
scheme must consult the state's code.
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Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?





(A) (2) A person commits first degree mur-
der if acting either alone or with one or
more other persons such person commits
or attempts to commit child abuse and in
the course of and in furtherance of such of-
fense or immediate flight from such of-
fense, such person or another person
causes the death of any person.
(B) Homicide, as defined in subsection A,
paragraph 2 of this section, requires no
specific mental state other than what is re-






Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273ab (West Supp.
1999)
Assault resulting in death of a child under 8
Assault by means of force that to a reason-






Any person who, having the care or custody
of a child who is under eight years of age,
assaults the child by means of force that to a
reasonable person would be likely to pro-
duce great bodily injury, resulting in the
child's death, shall be punished by impris-
onment in the state prison for 25 years to
life. Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued as affecting the applicability of §







Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 633 (1995 & Supp.
1998)






(a) A person is guilty of murder by abuse or
neglect in the second degree when, with
criminal negligence, that person causes the
death of a child and that person has en-
gaged in an act or previous pattern of abuse
and/or neglect of such child.
(b) For the purpose of this section: (1)
"Child" shall refer to any person who has
not yet reached that person's 14th birthday.
(2) "Abuse" and "neglect" shall have the
same meaning as set forth in § 1103 of this
title. (3) "Previous pattern" of abuse and/or
neglect shall mean two or more incidents of
conduct: (a) That constitute an act of abuse
and/or neglect; and (b) Are not so closely
related to each other or connected in point
of time and place that they constitute a sin-
gle event.
(c) A conviction is not required for an act
of abuse or neglect to be used in prosecu-
tion of a matter under this section includ-
ing an act used as proof of the previous
pattern as defined including one which may
be in paragraph (b) (3) of this section. A
conviction for any act of abuse or neglect
including one which may be relied upon to
establish the previous pattern of abuse
and/or neglect does not preclude prosecu-
tion under this section. Prosecution under
this section does not preclude prosecution






Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 634 (1995)






(a) A person is guilty of murder by abuse or
neglect in the first degree when that person
recklessly causes the death of a child and
has engaged in an act or previous pattern of
abuse and/or neglect of such child.
(b) For the purpose of this section: (1)
"Child" shall refer to any person who has
not yet reached that person's 14th birthday.
(2) "Abuse" and "neglect" shall have the
same meaning as set forth in § 1103 ofthis
tide. (3) "Previous pattern" of abuse and/or
neglect shall mean 2 or more incidents of
conduct (a) That constitute an act of abuse
and/or neglect; and (b) Are not so closely
related to each other or connected in point
of time and place that they constitute a sin-
gle event.
(c) A conviction is not required for an act
of abuse or neglect to be used in prosecu-
tion of a matter under this section includ-
ing an act used as proof of the previous
pattern as defined including one which may
be in paragraph (b) (3) of this section. A
conviction for any act of abuse or neglect
including one which may be relied upon to
establish the previous pattern of abuse
and/or neglect does not preclude prosecu-
tion under this section. Prosecution under
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(d) Murder by abuse and/or neglect in the
second degree is a class B felony.
Notwithstanding any provision of this title
to the contrary, the minimum sentence for
a person convicted or murder by abuse or
neglect in the second degree in violation of
this section shall be 10 years at Level V.
CHARLES A. PHIPPS
this section does not preclude prosecution
under any other section of the Code.
(d) Murder by abuse or neglect in the first





Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1) (a) (2) (h) (West
Supp. 1999)
First degree murder
No additional mental state





The unlawful killing of a human being
when committed by a person engaged in
the perpetration of, or in the attempt to
perpetrate, any aggravated child abuse, is
murder in the first degree and constitutes a






Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
IDAHO CODE § 18-4003(d) (1997)
First degree murder
No additional mental state
Yes-underlying felony of aggravated battery




Any murder committed in the perpetration
of, or attempt to perpetrate, aggravated bat-
tery on a child under twelve years of age is
murder of the first degree.
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Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
IOWA CODE § 707.2(5) (Supp. 1998)
First degree murder
Under circumstances manifesting extreme





A person commits murder in the first de-
gree when the person commits murder un-
der any of the following circumstances: the
person kills a child while committing child
endangerment under § 726.6(1) (b), or
while committing assault under § 708.1
upon the child, and the death occurs under
circumstances manifesting an extreme in-





Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401(b) (1995)
First degree murder
No additional mental state




Murder in the first degree is the killing of a
human being committed in the commission
of, attempt to commit, or flight from an in-
herently dangerous felony as defined in §
21-3436 and amendments thereto. [Abuse
of a child is listed as an inherently danger-







Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?





Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?





Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (A) (5) (West
1997)
First degree murder






First degree murder is the killing of a hu-
man being when the offender has the spe-
cific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm upon a victim under the age of twelve.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (A) (2) (b)
(West 1997 & Supp. 1999)
Second degree murder
Expressly applies even if there is no intent
to kill or inflict great bodily harm




Second degree murder is the killing of a
human being when the offender is engaged
in the perpetration of cruelty to juveniles,
even though he has no intent to kill or to
inflict great bodily harm.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32 (West 1997)
Negligent homicide
Criminal negligence (penalty for negligent
homicide is enhanced if a person kills a





(A) Negligent homicide is the killing of a
human being by criminal negligence.
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(B) The violation of a statute or ordinance
shall be considered only as presumptive
evidence of such negligence.
(C) Whoever commits the crime of negli-
gent homicide shall be imprisoned with or
without hard labor for not more than five
years, fined not more than five thousand
dollars, or both. However, if the victim was
killed as a result of receiving a battery and
was under the age of ten years, the offender
shall be imprisoned at hard labor, without
benefit of probation or suspension of sen-






Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
MINN. STAT. § 609.185(5) (Supp. 1999)
First degree murder
Under circumstances manifesting an ex-





Whoever does any of the following is guilty
of murder in the first degree and shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for life: causes
the death of a minor while committing
child abuse, when the perpetrator has en-
gaged in a past pattern of child abuse upon
the child and the death occurs under cir-
cumstances manifesting an extreme indif-







Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
MISS. CoDEANN. § 97-3-19(2) (f) (Supp.
1998)
Capital murder
With or without any design to effect the
death of another
Yes-underlying felonies of felonious child




The killing of a human being without the
authority of law by any means or in any
manner shall be capital murder in the fol-
lowing cases: When done with or without
any design to effect death, by any person
engaged in the commission of the crime of
felonious abuse and/or battery of a child in
violation of § 97-5-39(2), or in any attempt





Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(4) (McKinney
1998)
Second degree murder
Recklessly engages in conduct which creates
a grave risk of serious physical injury or
death under circumstances evincing a de-





A person is guilty of murder in the second
degree when under circumstances evincing
a depraved indifference to human life, and
being eighteen years old or more the de-
fendant recklegsly engages in conduct
which creates a grave risk of serious physical
injury or death to another person less than
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eleven years old and thereby causes the





Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(1) (c) (1997)
Murder
No additional mental state





A person is guilty of murder, a class AA fel-
ony, if the person acting either alone or
with one or more other persons, commits
or attempts to commit a felony offense
against a child under § 14-09-22 [abuse or
neglect of a child], and, in the course of
and in furtherance of such crime or of im-
mediate flight therefrom, the person or any
other participant in the crime causes the





Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tiL 21, § 701.7(C) (West
Supp. 1999)
First degree murder
Willful or malicious injuring, torturing,
maiming or using unreasonable force or
willfully cause, procure, or permit child





A person commits murder in the first de-
gree when the death of a child results from
the willful or malicious injuring, torturing,
maiming or using of unreasonable force by
said person or who shall willfully cause,
procure or permit any of said acts to be
1999 603
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done upon the child pursuant to Section
7115 of Title 10 of the Oklahoma Statutes
[child abuse]. It is sufficient for the crime
of murder in the first degree that the per-
son either willfully tortured or used unrea-
sonable force upon the child or maliciously





Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?





Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.095(1) (f) (Supp.
1998)
Aggravated murder





As used in § 163.105 and this section, "ag-
gravated murder" means murder as defined
in § 163.115 which is committed under, or
accompanied by, any of the following cir-
cumstances: The victim of the intentional
homicide was a person under the age of 14
years.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.115(1) (b) (J)
(Supp. 1998)
Murder
No additional mental state
Yes-underlying felonies of first or second




(1) (b) () Except as provided in § 163.118
and 163.125, criminal homicide constitutes
murder when it is committed by a person,
acting either alone or with one or more
persons, who commits or attempts to com-
mit any of the following crimes and in the
course of and in furtherance of the crime
the person is committing or attempting to
commit, or during the immediate flight
therefrom, the person, or another partici-
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Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
pant if there be any, causes the death of a
person other than one of the participants:
Assault in the first degree, as defined in §
163.185, and the victim is under 14 years of
age, or assault in the second degree, as de-
fined in § 163.175 (1) (a) or (b), and the
victim is under 14 years of age; or
(6) As used in this section: (a) "Assault"
means to intentionally, knowingly or reck-
lessly cause physical injury to another per-
son. "Assault" does not include the causing
of physical injury in a motor vehicle acci-
dent that occurs by reason of the reckless
conduct of a defendant. (b) "Neglect or
maltreatment" means a violation of §
163.535, 163.545 or 163.547 or a failure to
provide adequate food, clothing, shelter or
medical care that is likely to endanger the
health or welfare of a child under 14 years
of age or a dependent person. This para-
graph is not intended to replace or affect
the duty or standard of care required under
chapter 677. (c) "Pattern or practice"
means one or more previous episodes. (d)
"Torture" means to intentionally inflict in-
tense physical pain upon an unwilling vic-
tim as a separate objective apart from any
other purpose.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.115(1) (c) (Supp.
1998)
Murder






(1) (c) Except as provided in § 163.118 and
163.125, criminal homicide constitutes
murder by abuse when a person, recklessly
under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life,
causes the death of a child under 14 years
of age or a dependent person, as defined in
1999
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§ 163.205, and: (A) The person has previ-
ously engaged in a pattern or practice of as-
sault or torture of the victim or another
child under 14 years of age or a dependent
person; or (B) The person causes the death
by neglect or maltreatment.
(2) An accusatory instrument alleging mur-
der by abuse under subsection (1) (c) of this
section need not allege specific incidents of
assault or torture.
(6) As used in this section: (a) "Assault"
means to intentionally, knowingly or reck-
lessly cause physical injury to another per-
son. "Assault" does not include the causing
of physical injury in a motor vehicle acci-
dent that occurs by reason of the reckless
conduct of a defendant. (b) "Neglect or
maltreatment" means a violation of §
163.535, 163.545 or 163.547 or a failure to
provide adequate food, clothing, shelter or
medical care that is likely to endanger the
health or welfare of a child under 14 years
of age or a dependent person. This para-
graph is not intended to replace or affect
the duty or standard of care required under
chapter 677. (c) "Pattern or practice"
means one or more previous episodes. (d)
"Torture" means to intentionally inflict in-
tense physical pain upon an unwilling vic-
tim as a separate objective apart from any
other purpose.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.118(1) (c) (Supp.
1998)
Code section
Offense First degree manslaughter
Mental state Recklessly
Is this a felony murder statute? No
Is past pattern an element? Yes
Is care or custody an element? No
Applies to children under age: 14
Statutory excerpt (1) (c) Criminal homicide constitutes man-
slaughter in the first degree when a person
recklessly causes the death of a child under
14 years of age or a dependent person, as
606




Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
defined in ORS 163.205, and: (A) The per-
son has previously engaged in a pattern or
practice of assault or torture of the victim or
another child under 14 years of age or a
dependent person; or (B) The person
causes the death by neglect or maltreat-
ment, as defined in § 163.115.
(2) Manslaughter in the first degree is a
Class A felony.
(3) It is an affirmative defense to a charge
of violating subsection (1) (c) (B) of this sec-
tion that the child or dependent person was
under care or treatment solely by spiritual
means pursuant to the religious beliefs or
practices of the child or person or the par-
ent or guardian of the child or person.








(1) (c) Criminal homicide constitutes man-
slaughter in the second degree when a per-
son, with criminal negligence, causes the
death of a child under 14 years of age or a
dependent person, as defined in ORS
163.205, and: (A) The person has previ-
ously engaged in a pattern or practice of as-
sault or torture of the victim or another
child under 14 years of age or a dependent
person; or (B) The person causes the death
by neglect or maltreatment, as defined in §
163.115.
(2) Manslaughter in the second degree is a
Class B felony.
(3) It is an affirmative defense to a charge
of violating subsection (1) (c) (B) of this sec-
tion that the child or dependent person was
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under care or treatment solely by spiritual
means pursuant to the religious beliefs or
practices of the child or person or the par-





Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (West
1998)
Involuntary manslaughter
Recklessly or grossly negligent; involuntary
manslaughter is raised from a misdemeanor






(a) A person is guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter when as a direct result of the do-
ing of an unlawful act in a recklessly or
grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a
lawful act in a recklessly negligent manner,
he causes the death of another person.
(b) Involuntary manslaughter is a misde-
meanor of the first degree. Where the vic-
tim is under 12 years of age and is in the
care, custody or control of the person who
caused the death, involuntary manslaughter





Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85 (Law Co-op. Supp.
1998)
Homicide by child abuse
Under circumstances manifesting an ex-






RESPONDING TO CHILD HOMICIDE
Statutory excerpt (A) A person is guilty of homicide by child
abuse who: (1) causes the death of a child
under the age of eleven while committing
child abuse or neglect as defined in § 20-7-
490 and the death occurs under circum-
stances manifesting an extreme indiffer-
ence to human life; or (2) knowingly aids
and abets another person to commit child
abuse or neglect as defined in § 20-7490
and the child abuse or neglect results in the
death of a child under the age of eleven.
(B) Homicide by child abuse is a felony and
a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty
to homicide by child abuse: (1) under sub-
section (A) (1) may be imprisoned for life
but not less than a term of twenty years; or
(2) under subsection (A) (2) must be im-
prisoned for a term not exceeding twenty
years nor less than ten years.
(C) In sentencing a person under this sec-
tion the judge shall consider any aggravat-
ing circumstances, including, but not
limited to, a defendant's past pattern of
child abuse or neglect of a child under the
age of eleven, and any mitigating circum-
stances; however, a child's crying does not
constitute provocation so as to be consid-





Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202 (Supp. 1998)
First degree murder
No mental state need be proven other than
that required by the underlying felony
Yes-underlying felonies of aggravated child




(a) (2) First degree murder is a killing of
another committed in the perpetration of
1999
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or attempt to perpetrate any aggravated
child abuse or aggravated child neglect.
(b) No culpable mental state is required for
conviction under subdivision (a) (2) or
(a) (3) except the intent to commit the






Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?





Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1) (d) (Supp.
1998)
Capital murder
Intentionally or knowingly causes death in





Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated
murder if the actor intentionally or know-
ingly causes the death of another under any
of the following circumstances: the homi-
cide was committed while the actor was en-
gaged in the commission of, or an attempt
to commit, or flight after committing or at-
tempting to commit child abuse of a child
under the age of 14 years, as otherwise de-
fined in § 76-5-109(2) (a).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(1) (d) (Supp.
1998)
Murder
No additional mental state




Criminal homicide constitutes murder if
the actor while in the commission, at-
tempted commission, or immediate flight
from the commission or attempted commis-
sion of child abuse, as defined in § 76-5-
109 (2) (a), when the victim is younger than
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Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
14 years of age, causes the death of another
person other than a party as defined in §
76-2-202.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-208 (Supp. 1998)
Child abuse homicide
Degree of felony depends on the mental





(1) Criminal homicide constitutes child
abuse homicide if the actor causes the
death of a person under 17 years of age and
the death results from child abuse, as de-
fined in subsection 76-5-109(1): (a) if done
recklessly as provided in Subsection
76-5-109 (2) (b); (b) if done with criminal
negligence as provided in Subsection
76-5-109 (2) (c); or (c) if done with the men-
tal culpability as provided in Subsection
76-5-109(3) (a), (b), or (c).
(2) Child abuse homicide as described in
Subsection (1) (a) is a second degree felony.
(3) Child abuse homicide as described in






Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.055 (West
1988)
Homicide by abuse
Under circumstances manifesting an ex-





A person is guilty of homicide by abuse if,
under circumstances manifesting an ex-
treme indifference to human life, the per-
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son causes the death of a child or person
under sixteen years of age and the person
has previously engaged in a pattern or prac-
tice of assault or torture of said child, or





Is this a felony murder statute?
Is past pattern an element?
Is care or custody an element?
Applies to children under age:
Statutory excerpt
W. VA. CODE § 61-8D-2a (1997)
Death of a child by a parent
Maliciously and intentionally inflicts sub-






(a) If any parent, guardian or custodian
shall maliciously and intentionally inflict
upon a child under his or her care, custody
or control substantial physical pain, illness
or any impairment of physical condition by
other than accidental means, thereby caus-
ing the death of such child, then such par-
ent, guardian or custodian shall be guilty of
a felony.
(b) If any parent, guardian or custodian
shall knowingly allow any other person to
maliciously and intentionally inflict upon a
child under the care, custody or control of
such parent, guardian or custodian substan-
tial physical pain, illness or any impairment
of physical condition by other than acciden-
tal means, which thereby causes the death
of such child, then such other person and
such parent, guardian or custodian shall
each be guilty of a felony.
(c) Any person convicted of a felony de-
scribed in subsection (a) or (b) of this sec-
tion shall be punished by a definite term of
imprisonment in the penitentiary which is
not less than ten nor more than forty years.
A person imprisoned pursuant to the provi-
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sions of this section is not eligible for parole
prior to having served a minimum of ten
years of his or her sentence or the mini-
mum period required by the provisions of §
62-12-13, whichever is greater.
(d) The provisions of this section shall not
apply to any parent, guardian or custodian
or other person who, without malice, fails
or refuses, or allows another person to,
without malice, fail or refuse, to supply a
child under the care, custody or control of
such parent, guardian or custodian with
necessary medical care, when such medical
care conflicts with the tenets and practices
of a recognized religious denomination or
order of which such parent, guardian or
custodian is an adherent or member.
The provisions of this section shall not ap-
ply to any health care provider who fails or
refuses, or allows another person to fail or
refuse, to supply a child with necessary
medical care when such medical care con-
flicts with the tenets and practices of a rec-
ognized religious denomination or order of
which the parent, guardian or custodian of
the child is an adherent or member, or
where such failure or refusal is pursuant to
a properly executed do not resuscitate
form.
1999
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